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The idea that simple omniscience conflicts with free will is based on a simple misconception about the necessity involved. Say God knows that tomorrow I will drink a cup of coffee. This entails that necessarily I will drink a cup of coffee tomorrow. It does not entail that I will necessarily drink a cup of coffee tomorrow. To put it another way, the necessity is de dicto, necessity of the statement, not de re, necessity of the fact. The truth of proposition is necessary, not the activity in the statement. That this is true can be easily seen if we look at statements about the past. If I know I had a cup of coffee this morning, then necessarily I had a cup of coffee this morning. But nobody would say that this means I didn't have any choice in the matter.
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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