02-16-2005, 03:52 AM
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#47 (permalink)
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Banned
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Quote:
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Originally Posted by host
daswig: when you or any other TFP member posts what I am
quoting from you, posted by you on this thread, I am going
to post these three things to refute what you are posting.
I plan to number each instance, consecutively. I'll stop when
you or other members stop, or if Duelfer or his succesor and
the POTUS, and the nytimes.com, all agree that the determination on whether WMDs were found, changes signifigantly. If more than the following documentation is
required by a signifigant majority of readers and posters on
the TFP political thread to "state the facts" surroundingt a contentious issue, then delusion will stifle more reasoned
points of view, in every instance.
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this is the full text of page 78 of Section 3 of the Duelfer Report, available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol3.pdf
Pay special attention to the bold, italicized part that's separated.
Quote:
Exploitations of Al Muthanna
ISG conducted multiple exploitations of the
Al Muthanna site to determine whether old chemical
weapons, equipment, or toxic chemicals had been
looted or tampered with since the last UN visit to
the site. ISG is unable to unambiguously determine
the complete fate of old munitions, materials, and
chemicals produced and stored there. The matter is
further complicated by the looting and razing done
by the Iraqis.
An exploitation of the facility reconfirmed previous
imagery analysis that the site remained inoperable
from bombings and UNSCOM compliance, including
destruction of equipment and resources, and no
signifi cant production capabilities existed. Facilities
and bunkers revealed no evidence of production
since UNSCOM departed.
The teams found no new structures or any construction
activities except for those declared by Iraq to
UNSCOM. The facilities appeared to be abandoned
prior to OIF.
Several pieces of equipment that were once used
for CW production were found bearing no UN
tags, and the ISG was unable to assess whether the
equipment had been reused since 1994 or intended
for a future production processes and abandoned.
The tag system used by the UN was known to not
be robust, and given the absence of inspectors
between 1998 and 2002, Iraq would have had little
incentive to maintain the tags in good condition.
The extent of the looting and unaccounted for excavations
of bombed facilities makes it impossible
to determine what, if any, equipment was removed
after 1994, either for legitimate industrial use or a
renovated CW production process.
ISG exploitations indicate that the storage area still
remains a threat despite testing. Chemical storage
containers fi lled with unknown hazardous chemicals
are showing signs of rusting-through and leaking.
Key bunkers and facilities are currently scheduled
to be sealed or resealed.
Stockpiles of chemical munitions are still stored
there. The most dangerous ones have been declared
to the UN and are sealed in bunkers. Although
declared, the bunkers contents have yet to be con-
firmed. These areas of the compound pose a hazard
to civilians and potential blackmarketers.
Numerous bunkers, including eleven cruciform
shaped bunkers were exploited. Some of the bunkers
were empty. Some of the bunkers contained
large quantities of unfi lled chemical munitions,
conventional munitions, one-ton shipping containers,
old disabled production equipment (presumed
disabled under UNSCOM supervision), and other
hazardous industrial chemicals. The bunkers were
dual-use in storing both conventional and chemical
munitions. Figure 12 is a typical side-view of a
cruciform shaped bunker.
The contents of two of the cruciform bunkers
bombed during Desert Storm showed severe
damage. Due to the hazards associated with this
location, the UN decided to seal the bunkers.
UNSCOM viewed the contents of the two bunkers;
however an accurate inventory was not possible due
to the hazards associated with that environment.
UNSCOM relied upon Iraqi accountability of the
bunkers contents and assessed the amount of munitions
declared to be realistic.
Military fi eld testing equipment showed positive
for possible CW agent in the cruciform bunkers
that contained munitions and a storage bunker that
contained bulk chemical storage containers. Note:
this is not unusual given the munitions once stored
there and the conditions in which they were stored
post 1994.
An exploitation team observed the old UNSCOM
CW destruction area that contained large (some
in excess of 75 meter) sloping trenches once used
in the CW destruction process. Damaged chemical
storage drums were visible at the bottom of some of
the trenches.
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Do you have ANYTHING to refute this? |
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