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					Originally Posted by Mr Mephisto
					
				 Erm...  How do they know there is WMD in it if it hasn't been opened?   
And surely, if this truly were the case, we would have heard this trumpeted at proof.  This is the first I've ever heard that WMD's were indeed discovered.
 
And finally, no one is arguing over the fact that WMD's did  exist (we all know they did), but whether there was an active programme and whether Iraq was a real threat to the US.
 
Mr Mephisto | 
	
 They're under seal from an international agency from right after the cease-fire, they have the manifests of what's in there, but because of the way it was stored, they're more than slightly concerned about how to get it all out safely.
FYI, their inventory was supposed to be destroyed according to the cease-fire, but apparently they didn't get around to it.
this is the full text of page 78 of Section 3 of the Duelfer Report, available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol3.pdf
Pay special attention to the bold, italicized part that's separated.
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		| Exploitations of Al Muthanna ISG conducted multiple exploitations of the
 Al Muthanna site to determine whether old chemical
 weapons, equipment, or toxic chemicals had been
 looted or tampered with since the last UN visit to
 the site. ISG is unable to unambiguously determine
 the complete fate of old munitions, materials, and
 chemicals produced and stored there. The matter is
 further complicated by the looting and razing done
 by the Iraqis.
 An exploitation of the facility reconfirmed previous
 imagery analysis that the site remained inoperable
 from bombings and UNSCOM compliance, including
 destruction of equipment and resources, and no
 signifi cant production capabilities existed. Facilities
 and bunkers revealed no evidence of production
 since UNSCOM departed.
  The teams found no new structures or any construction
 activities except for those declared by Iraq to
 UNSCOM. The facilities appeared to be abandoned
 prior to OIF.
  Several pieces of equipment that were once used
 for CW production were found bearing no UN
 tags, and the ISG was unable to assess whether the
 equipment had been reused since 1994 or intended
 for a future production processes and abandoned.
  The tag system used by the UN was known to not
 be robust, and given the absence of inspectors
 between 1998 and 2002, Iraq would have had little
 incentive to maintain the tags in good condition.
  The extent of the looting and unaccounted for excavations
 of bombed facilities makes it impossible
 to determine what, if any, equipment was removed
 after 1994, either for legitimate industrial use or a
 renovated CW production process.
  ISG exploitations indicate that the storage area still
 remains a threat despite testing. Chemical storage
 containers fi lled with unknown hazardous chemicals
 are showing signs of rusting-through and leaking.
  Key bunkers and facilities are currently scheduled
 to be sealed or resealed.
 
 
 Stockpiles of chemical munitions are still stored
 there. The most dangerous ones have been declared
 to the UN and are sealed in bunkers. Although
 declared, the bunkers contents have yet to be con-
 firmed. These areas of the compound pose a hazard
 to civilians and potential blackmarketers.
 
 
 
  Numerous bunkers, including eleven cruciform
 shaped bunkers were exploited. Some of the bunkers
 were empty. Some of the bunkers contained
 large quantities of unfi lled chemical munitions,
 conventional munitions, one-ton shipping containers,
 old disabled production equipment (presumed
 disabled under UNSCOM supervision), and other
 hazardous industrial chemicals. The bunkers were
 dual-use in storing both conventional and chemical
 munitions. Figure 12 is a typical side-view of a
 cruciform shaped bunker.
  The contents of two of the cruciform bunkers
 bombed during Desert Storm showed severe
 damage. Due to the hazards associated with this
 location, the UN decided to seal the bunkers.
  UNSCOM viewed the contents of the two bunkers;
 however an accurate inventory was not possible due
 to the hazards associated with that environment.
  UNSCOM relied upon Iraqi accountability of the
 bunkers contents and assessed the amount of munitions
 declared to be realistic.
  Military fi eld testing equipment showed positive
 for possible CW agent in the cruciform bunkers
 that contained munitions and a storage bunker that
 contained bulk chemical storage containers. Note:
 this is not unusual given the munitions once stored
 there and the conditions in which they were stored
 post 1994.
 An exploitation team observed the old UNSCOM
 CW destruction area that contained large (some
 in excess of 75 meter) sloping trenches once used
 in the CW destruction process. Damaged chemical
 storage drums were visible at the bottom of some of
 the trenches.
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