CSflim

True. But there is no fundamental stumbling block here. It just means we have to be quite precise when it comes to defining the property.

But your example quite properly shows up the point I have being trying to make in this thread: There are two seperate understanding of the word colour in use. The apparent philosophical 'problem' arises from the confusion of the two. (see the fallacy of equivocation).

Very roughly, the two meaning are distinguished thus:
1. colour as an objective property of an object
2. colour as a subjective experience/sensation (known as 'qualia' in the philosophy of mind)

In the majority of cases, objects with the physical propery of red (meaning 1) cause us, when we look at them, to experience (what we label as) 'red' sensations (meaning 2).

When we state that 'colour' in the second sense, doesn't exist in the real world, we are not being insightful, we are essentially stating a tautology.


There are of courses, cases where the colour-experiences do not match the colour-properties.

For example:
Looking at a purple object while wearing red contact lenses.
Looking at a purple object bathed in blue light.
Looking at a blue object moving away from us at enormous speed (not sure how often this noticably occurs in daily life!)
Looking at an orange (the fruit) in poor light, people will report seeing the colour orange, despite the fact that the fruit has been, unknown to them, painted blue.
I'm sure you can continue to make up your own further examples...



As for the other point which inevitably arose in this thread, the problem of other minds (do I see red like you see red?), that is a far trickier question, and it is, at the moment most certainly insoluble.
Whether it is destined to remain that way forever is another question.

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