No it's not, MartinGuerre. The closest thing to a definition in the post is the following
Quote:
It all stems from the fact that something supernatural is either beyond or not capable of being comprehended.
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But that's either not a definition, or a really bad one. What Robaggio might want to be doing is arguing from some definition of 'supernatural' (like 'beyond natural') to its incomprehensibility. This argument might run something like this:
What is supernatural is, by definition, beyond what is natural. But we are natural creatures; everything we know is built up on information we receive from our senses. Therefore, we cannot know the supernatural.
That's a halfway decent argument. But it's unsound. First of all, it ignores the possibility that we might have some sort of 'sixth sense', such that we can sense the supernatural. But since I don't really believe in a sixth sense, let's go to objection two. Second, this argument ignores a priori knowledge. I know that 2 + 2 = 4. And I could know that without having ever seen two objects being placed with two objects to make four objects. I know that a round square is impossible, but I've never seen a round square being impossible. Thirdly, it ignores the possibility that the supernatural might present itself to our senses, by, say, taking on a body or giving us a book to read. While this would not be sufficient for comprehension of the supernatural, it would be sufficient for saying some true things about the supernatural ("Look it says here God is like a mother hen. Therefore, God must be like a mother hen.") Fourthly, it ignores the possibility that I could use the natural to deduce things about the supernatural, in much the same way I can use one sense to deduce information normally gained from a different one (I hear someone in the next room, therefore, there is someone in the next room; the universe requires a cause, nothing natural could be its cause, therefore there must be supernatural). I suggest something like this in the 'faith' thread, when I mention Kant and Kierkegaard.
So, am I getting your argument right, Robaggio, or is there something I'm missing?