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the question of beliefs about the world, about the subject or "individual" in that world, is something that i find most useful to think about within the purview of the classical conception of the political.
maybe this is why i have some trouble with the question as it is posed--it seems to assume that what is at stake is a free-floating individual, unconditioned by socialization, and what that individual comes to understand about his or her relation to this theater called the world.
within this, it sounds like you want to oppose experience to a metaphysics.
but your viewpoint seems nontheless to recapitulate aspects of metphysics in the way you frame your opposition--the isolated individual, for example, is a metaphysical concept; the notion of experience as such is as well.
the idea of rejecting reified concepts: how is that other than an inversion? what does it actually entail? what kind of assumptions about your embeddeness in the world have to be in place for this operation to get thought about, not to mention started?
in general, i think zen-tom poses an interesting way of going about thinking on this matter of belief--that axioms are not demonstrable from within a proof that presupposes them--yes, well there you are---but if you map this onto the social, then the question does not seem to operate well within the purview of belief--rather it seems on a different register, more political in nature. one could counter a given set of arguments about the world with another set of arguments....people could find one set of arguments preferable to another, for any number of reasons. i am not sure how the question of belief as such would function in this space.
i guess i am cloudy on what is actually being discussed here.
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a gramophone its corrugated trumpet silver handle
spinning dog. such faithfulness it hear
it make you sick.
-kamau brathwaite
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