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That's simply false, Livia, as I've already argued. From the proposition "God knows that I will drive to Grand Rapids tomorrow", you can only infer (A)"Necessarily, I will drive to Grand Rapids tomorrow", not (A')"I will necessarily drive to Grand Rapids tomorrow". But for free will, the following proposition needs to be true: (B) "I will freely drive to Grand Rapids tomorrow". But this is the denial of A', not of A, since the denial of A is just "Possibly I will drive to Grand Rapids tomorrow." And the contingency of an action is not identical to its freedom; as pointed out in another thread somewhere, random acts are contingent, yet not free. The difference is that the necessity in question is the necessity of the statement, not the necessity of the action.
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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