Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - View Single Post - Ohio Ballot Recount Will Happen....What Will it Reveal?

host · 11-17-2004, 01:40 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by tellumFS

As flawed as the voting machines maybe, there was a discussion about this on Minnesota Public Radio yesterday, and it was brought up that the machines are tested by independent committees, and after approval they're purchased by states. I don't recall the name of the commissions that does the testing, or the details of it, but the show can be found on MPR's web site:

http://news.minnesota.publicradio.or...20041115.shtml

Guess again....Diebold made sure that their voting machines were not tested
for "security"

Quote:

<a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/">http://www.blackboxvoting.org/</a>
SUNDAY Nov. 7 2004: We’re awaiting independent analysis on some pretty crooked-looking elections. In the mean time, here’s something to chew on.

Your local elections officials trusted a group called NASED -- the National Association of State Election Directors -- to certify that your voting system is safe.

This trust was breached.

NASED certified the systems based on the recommendation of an “Independent Testing Authority” (ITA).
<table>
<tr>
<td width="120">
“Whuuut?” 
<img src="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/perplexed3.jpe">
</td>
<td>
What no one told local officials was that the ITA did not test for security (and NASED didn’t seem to mind).
</td>
</tr>
</table>

The ITA reports are considered so secret that even the California Secretary of State’s office had trouble getting its hands on one. The ITA refused to answer any questions about what it does. Imagine our surprise when, due to Freedom of Information requests, a couple of them showed up in our mailbox.

The most important test on the ITA report is called the “penetration analysis.” This test is supposed to tell us whether anyone can break into the system to tamper with the votes. 

“Not applicable,” wrote Shawn Southworth, of Ciber Labs, the ITA that tested the Diebold GEMS central tabulator software. “Did not test.”

<center>
This is Shawn Southworth, in his office in Huntsville, Alabama. 
He is the man who carefully examines our voting software. 

<img src="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/southworth.jpe">
</center>
Shawn Southworth “tested” whether every candidate on the ballot has a name. But we were shocked to find out that, when asked the most important question -- about vulnerable entry points -- Southworth’s report says “not reviewed.”

Americans want to know: 
<img src="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/perplexed2.jpe">

Ciber “tested”whether the manual gives a description of the voting system. But when asked to identify methods of attack (which we think the American voter would consider pretty important), the top-secret report says “not applicable.”

Ciber “tested” whether ballots comply with local regulations, but when Bev Harris asked Shawn Southworth what he thinks about Diebold tabulators accepting large numbers of “minus” votes, he said he didn’t mention that in his report because “the vendors don’t like him to put anything negative” in his report. After all, he said, he is paid by the vendors.

“Hmmmm.” 
<img src="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/perplexed1.jpe">

Shawn Southworth didn’t do the penetration analysis, but check out what he wrote: 

“<a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/Diebold-smallciber.pdf">Ciber recommends</a> to the NASED committee that GEMS software version 1.18.15 be certified and assigned NASED certification number N03060011815.”

Was this just a one-time oversight?

Nope. It appears to be more like a habit. Here is the same <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/Votehere-ciber.pdf">Ciber certification section for VoteHere</a>; as you can see, the critical security test, the “penetration analysis” was again marked “not applicable” and was not done.

Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis?

Apparently not. We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories report. In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems, but says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could continue with the same flaws. At one point the Wyle report omits its testing altogether, hoping the vendor will do the test.

<h2>Computer Guys: Be your own ITA certifier.</h2>


Here is a copy of the full Ciber report (part <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/DieboldCiberReport1.PDF">1</a>, <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/DieboldCiberReport2.PDF">2</a>, <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/DieboldCiberReport3.PDF">3</a>, <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/DieboldCiberReport4.PDF">4</a>) on GEMS 1.18.15. Here is a zip file download for the <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/GEMSIS-1-18-15.zip">GEMS 1.18.15 program</a>. Here is a real live <a href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/coloradospringscityelection.mdb">Diebold vote database</a>. Compare your findings against the official testing lab and see if you agree with what Ciber says. E-mail us your findings.

TIPS: The password for the vote database is “password” and you should place it in the “LocalDB” directory in the GEMS folder, which you’ll find in “program files.”

<h2>Who the heck is NASED?</h2>

They are the people who certified this stuff. 

<img src="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/confused.jpe">

You’ve gotta ask yourself: Are they nuts? Some of them are computer experts. Well, it seems that several of these people suddenly want to retire, and the whole NASED voting systems board is becoming somewhat defunct, but these are the people responsible for today's shoddy voting systems.

If the security of the U.S. electoral system depends on you to certify a voting system, and you get a report that plainly states that security was “not tested” and “not applicable” -- what would you do?

Perhaps we should ask them. Go ahead. Let's hold them accountable for the election we just had. (Please, e-mail us their answers) They don't make it very easy to get their e-mail and fax information; when you find it, <a href="mailto:Bev@blackboxvoting.org">let us know</a> and we'll post it here.

NASED VOTING SYSTEMS/ITA ACCREDITATION BOARD

(You can find some contact info at <a href="
http://www.co.rock.wi.us/departments/CntyClerk/state_election.htm">this site</a>)

Thomas R. Wilkey, Executive Director, New York State Board of Elections; twilkey@elections.state.ny.us, phone 518 474-8100, fax 518 473-8315 

David Elliott, (former) Asst. Director of Elections, Washington State -- (note from Black Box Voting: he has left and we have been unable to find his home number. We are very interested in David Elliott, for a number of reasons. If you can locate his addess, e-mail it to us privately.)

James Hendrix, Executive Director, State Election Commission, South Carolina; <a href="mailto:Jreynold@scsec.state.sc.us">Jreynold@scsec.state.sc.us</a>, phone, 803 734-9060; FAX 803 734-9363 

Denise Lamb, Director, State Bureau of Elections, New Mexico; phone (505) 827-3620 FAX (505) 827-8403 FAX (505) 827-3634
<a href="denise.lamb@state.nm.us">denise.lamb@state.nm.us</a>

Sandy Steinbach, Director of Elections, Iowa; phone, (515) 281-5823 FAX (515) 281-7142 <a href="mailto:sandy@sos.state.ia.us">sandy@sos.state.ia.us</a>

Donetta Davidson, Secretary of State, Colorado; <a href="mailto:donetta.davidson@state.co.us">donetta.davidson@state.co.us</a>;
phone, 303 894-2680 x301 - Fax 303 894-7732

Connie Schmidt, Commissioner, Johnson County Election Commission, Kansas; Fax: 913.791.1753 <a href="mailto:schmidt@jocoks.com">schmidt@jocoks.com</a>

(the late) Robert Naegele, President Granite Creek Technology, Pacific Grove, California

Brit Williams, Professor, CSIS Dept, Kennesaw State College, Georgia; <a href="mailto:brit@kennesaw.edu">brit@kennesaw.edu</a>
770)423-6422

Paul Craft, Computer Audit Analyst, Florida State Division of Elections
Florida <a href="mailto

craft@mail.dos.state.fl.us">pcraft@mail.dos.state.fl.us</a>

Steve Freeman, Software Consultant, League City, Texas; <a href="mailto:svfreemn@ix.netcom.com">svfreemn@ix.netcom.com</a>

Jay W. Nispel, Senior Principal Engineer, Computer Sciences Corporation
Annapolis Junction, Maryland

Yvonne Smith (Member Emeritus), Former Assistant to the Executive Director
Illinois State Board of Elections, Illinois; phone (312) 814-6468 FAX (312) 814-6485 <a href="mailto:ysmith@elections.state.il.us">ysmith@elections.state.il.us</a>

Penelope Bonsall, Director, Office of Election Administration, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C.; "<a href="mailto

bonsall@fec.gov">pbonsall@fec.gov</a>

Committee Secretariat: The Election Center, R. Doug Lewis, Executive Director
Houston, Texas, Tele: 281-293-0101 <a href="electioncent@pdq.net">electioncent@pdq.net</a>
Cell 713 516-2875 - Fax 281-293-0453