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Originally Posted by redlemon
Booboo - Let's say Candidates A and B are very similar, and C is very different. 60% of the voters like both A and B. 40% like C. In the current system, C could easily win, since A and B could end up with about 30% apiece. Approval voting would put A and B both above C.
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As I understand it, candidate C
should win in this scenario. If C has 40% and A and/or B only have 30% each, C is more generally like than either A or B. Approval voting would put A and B (each netting just 30%) above C (netting 40%).
I'm still not following the logic you are laying here as to why that would be better than IRV.
This is from the original website:
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Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is also known as the "Alternative Vote" and "Preferential Voting." Voters rank the candidates as first, second, third, etc. The tables to the left illustrate the IRV tallying procedure for an example with four candidates (A,B,C,D) and 16 voters. The leftmost table shows the original votes in sorted order (the last choice is not shown).
The first step is to count the first choices. Candidate B got 6 of the 16 first choices, while A got 5, D got 3, and C got 2. If one candidate had received a majority of first choices, that candidate would have won, but nobody did in this case. The counting procedure therefore goes to a second round.
The candidate with the fewest first choices, candidate C, is now eliminated. Each vote for C is transferred to the next candidate. Thus, all C entries are eliminated and the remaining choices are pushed left, if necessary, to fill in the empty cells. The middle table shows the result (the third column is no longer needed).
The top choices are now counted again. Candidate A gained one new top choice (the second from last vote) for a total of 6. Still no candidate has a majority, so the counting procedure goes to a third round. Candidate D now has the fewest top choices and is therefore eliminated. The rightmost table shows the result.
In the final round, the third from last vote has been exhausted, so only 15 active votes remain. Candidate A picked up two votes and now has 8 votes, which is a majority of the remaining votes, so candidate A wins. In this example, candidate A had fewer first choices than candidate B in the first round, but ultimately won the election.
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The main contention I have with their conclusion is that they constantly argue against the results based on the initial vote pattern.
In this case, it's more explict than in the original claim. Notice--in the last sentence, the claim is that A won over B even though A had fewer initial votes. Of course, we should back up here and realize that the purpose of IRV is not to guarantee that the person with the most initial votes wins, but htat the person with the most end votes wins. That is, to guarantee that the majority of the population gets a candidate it is willing to accept if the top choice doesn't net a majority of the votes. That is, it's perfectly acceptable and desirable that B not win, because A received a majority of the votes with the final tally--not B.
This is from the top of this thread:
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Suppose my true preference is for the Libertarian first and the Republican second. Suppose further that the Libertarians are the strongest "minor" party. At some round of the IRV counting process, all the candidates will be eliminated except the Republican, the Democrat, and the Libertarian. If the Libertarian then has the fewest first-choice votes, he or she will be eliminated and my vote will transfer to the Republican, just as I wanted. But what if the Republican is eliminated before the Libertarian? Unless all the Republican votes transfer to the Libertarian, which is extremely unlikely, the Democrat might then beat the Libertarian. If so, I will have helped the Democrat win by not strategically ranking the Republican first. But that's the same situation I'm in now if I vote my true preference for the Libertarian!
What happened in the above example is that IRV essentially ignored one of my key preferences. By voting (Libertarian, Republican, ..., Democrat), I increase the chances that the Republican will be eliminated before the Libertarian. If that then happens, my preference for the Republican over the Democrat is essentially discarded or ignored. This is the fundamental problem with IRV. The only preference that is sure to be counted is my first choice.
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Notice that the writer is hinging his argument of a dilemma on the spectre that the only 'sure' preference is one's first choice. Well, we could argue that's all that should be sure, except that secret method responded to me that the idea isn't to 'guarantee' a candidate anyway--so what's the problem here?
The only way a candidate will win is if he or she nets a majority of the votes. I could argue hypothetically, as this article id, that it's unlikely that the republican votes would transfer to the libertarians. But isn't it just as unlikely (or moreso) that they would shift to the democrat?!
In any case, one's preference is not 'ignored.' It simply didn't win out. If that were a valid criticism of voting procedures, roughly half of america is going to feel left out this voting cycle when their top (and only) choice isn't selected. In fact, under no circumstances will every voter get his or her top choice unless we agree to elect all candidates! I find that proposition silly.
The only way a libertarian couldn't get either a libertarian or republican candidate into office is if all libertarian votes or all republican votes still couldn't muster a majority. The only way the democratic candidate would win is if he or she was able to muster a majority of the votes--that's exactly what should happen in my opinion of how the voting system operates best.
If you can't get a majority with all of the votes sliding from one to another, then you don't have the most popular candidate and will just have to suck it up until the next cycle. That's the short and nasty of it unless someone will take the time to explain where my logical errors are occurring.