One of my professors, Peter VanInwagen (for those interested in Free Will vs. Determinism, his book "An Essay on Free Will" is a must read) believes that both free will and determinism can be disproven with sound philosophical arguments -- I'm not sure I agree with him but I see why he says that. The problem of randomness is a very serious one for non-compatibilists. Why? Well, the whole notion of free will is that we are in control of our actions. If our actions are random, it's hard to see how we could be in control of them. Likewise, if our actions are pre-determined, it's hard to see how we could be in control of them. I just happen to think it's more difficult to see in the case of determinism.
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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