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Firstly, it's important to distinguish between the practical notion of predictability and the ontological notion of determinism. (A "random" number generation algorithm is deterministic but unpredictable).
Secondly, it needs to be made quite clear what indeterminacy has to do with free will in the first place.
An argument could perhaps be made that determinism implies no free will (I would probably disagree with it, but at least it would be coherent).
But now that physics seems to have moved beyond determinism, people keep trotting out the same completely BIZZARE argument that indeterminacy implies free will.
"A implies B, therefore, not A implies not B" is of course a completely fallacious argument.
Surely RANDOM, undirected behaviour is the complete antithesis of free will?
In my opinion the determinism/indeterminism of the brain is irrelevant to discussions of free will.
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