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Junkie
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Promoting Reform in the Middle East -or- Deceptive Imperialism
There is another important angle to this war that I don't think enough attention has been paid to, that I'd like to bring up:
Reform in the Middle East.
These articles go a long way, imo, in maybe helping understand the more important reason(s) for US military intervention in the Middle East.
Quote:
Broaden the Road Map
By Saad Eddin Ibrahim
The Washington Post, Monday, May 12, 2003; Page A19
The doors are opening for democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. The yearning for peace is unmistakable and the aspiration for development universal. The post-Saddam Hussein era offers a momentous opportunity to achieve these objectives.
But a regional road map is needed. It is time for a forceful -- not arrogant -- message from the United States to the people and rulers of the region -- a message that America will be a reliable partner in the pursuit of democracy, peace and development. Only with such a vision, and a carefully drawn map, can the United States avoid being dragged into repeated armed intervention. And only with it can the long-suffering peoples of the region finally join the community of open democratic societies.
With less than 10 percent of the world's population, this area has accounted for more than 30 percent of the armed conflicts since 1945. Its vital strategic location and valuable oil resources made the region, in the words of Dwight Eisenhower, "the most expensive piece of real estate in the world." This, rather than lofty ideals, may explain why the United States has deployed its armed forces in the Middle East more often than in any other region since World War II.
A prime reason for repeated military intervention there, by the United States and others, is the weak state systems in the region, created in the aftermath of World War I and later confounded by the establishment of Israel. Drawn by Britain and France, the artificial and arbitrary boundaries of most Middle Eastern states gave rise to both interstate conflict and protracted civil wars. Neither nation-building nor state institutions have had adequate time or stability to properly mature. Cold War rivalry and the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict generated frequent military coups and autocratic regimes. To hold on to power, these regimes espoused a mix of "national liberation," socialist economics and the assertion of cultural authenticity. This package came to be known as the "populist social contract," which promised every desirable goal -- except democracy, which had to wait until all other objectives were attained.
Despite early signs that it was not working, autocracies that espoused the populist social contract so perfected their technologies of repression that the populace was subdued and intimidated. The few who dared voice their dissent were co-opted, thrown in prison as "traitors," forced to flee the country or simply killed.
By the turn of the 21st century, it became clear that the populist social contract was not just a dismal failure but was dragging the region and the world into repeated wars. The term "failed state" aptly describes most if not all of the states in the region. These failed states have not only betrayed the hopes of their own people but have given rise to a variety of discontented Islamic activism, the events of 9/11 being the most horrific example.
The regimes of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban represented clear examples of the worst failed secular and theocratic states, which explains the relative ease with which they were brought down. The bulk of the population in both countries welcomed their demise. Whether those who brought that about will be perceived as benevolent forces of liberation or imperial armies of occupation will depend on whether promises of peace, democracy and justice are seriously pursued.
It will be more difficult dealing with other states in the region whose regimes are as hated at home as Iraq's but which are not seen in an equally bad light by the international community. Examples include Syria, Libya, Sudan and Iran. Yet more problematic are those the Western powers have long considered "friendly" regimes -- Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia. These states have generated a disproportionate share of domestic and international terrorism, arguably on account of thwarted democracy and draconian emergency laws.
The concept of a road map has gained currency since the U.S.-led "Quartet" agreed last fall on broad outlines for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The implementation of this plan is a sine qua non for any prospect of American success in Iraq or of the implementation of Secretary of State Colin Powell's December initiative for educational and political reform in the region.
The emotive power of the Palestinian question for Arabs and Muslims need not be reiterated. Much of the anti-American sentiment generated by the war in Iraq is traceable to it. It has become the prism through which much of what the United States does or says is viewed.
A forceful and sustainable effort by the United States to bring about an equitable resolution to the Palestinian question will make its other major tasks in the region much easier. Most Israelis, with one real or imagined threat removed by the fall of Hussein's regime, would be willing to endorse a historic compromise equally acceptable to most Palestinians. The United States must seize the moment before extremists on both sides manage, as they have so many times in the past, to ruin this opportunity.
But more is needed than a settlement of the Palestinian question. Democracy and development are two important requisites for a dynamic, peaceful regional equilibrium. Democracy must provide greater inclusiveness of the hitherto disenfranchised, such as women, the young and minority groups. Open and free debates are essential. Doing away with the infamous emergency laws and national state security courts must be parts of the democratic reform process. So should constitutional amendments setting strict term limits for presidents and prime ministers. Competitive presidential elections, not plebiscites, must be enshrined, in clear terms.
In the post-Hussein era, every dictator in the region must be nervously recalculating his options. No doubt each would like to convey the notion that he is different, or at least was never as bad. There will be dire warnings that "forcing democracy" on their people will backfire. The specter of an Iranian-style Islamic takeover may be raised. False cultural arguments that certain groups are not suited to democratic institutions may be used.
We know better. There is an abundance of social science literature that documents the transition to democratic systems across national, cultural, racial and religious lines in some 100 countries. We know it is a matter of commitment by the elites to democratic rules of the political game, constitutional craftsmanship, a supportive regional neighborhood and a nurturing community of older democracies. A growing and eager, modern, educated Arab middle class has been clamoring for liberal democracy. It is only when repeatedly rebuffed by entrenched autocracies at home and ignored by established democracies abroad that segments of that class may defect to Islamic activism.
The countries of the Middle East and North Africa have varying but substantial degrees of willingness, readiness and eagerness for democracy and peace. Peoples of the region have suffered enough from armed conflicts, brutal despotism and economic privation. With a measure of patience and the active engagement of indigenous forces, the United States and other Western powers can assist the democratic transformation of the region.
The writer is an Egyptian American professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo who has been active in promoting democracy in Egypt.
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