Tilted Forum Project Discussion Community - View Single Post

asaris · 06-02-2004, 06:57 AM

Nice rhetoric, alkaloid, but I don't see the argument.

It seems to me to be rather clear that we have free will, in some sense of the word. Consider the two following arguments.

1. It is clear that we have moral responsibility for some of our actions. Yet some actions, which we might otherwise consider to be immoral, we excuse with language like "He was forced to". Now, leaving out cases where the 'compulsion' is merely coercion, it is rather easy to come up with cases where, in ordinary language, we'd describe the agent in question as acting against their will. We typically view this as exculpatory. Let us by stipulation call that feature, which ascribes to some acts moral responsibility and which excuses other acts when it is being acted against, free will.

2. Consider two scenarios where a man on the subway kicks my shin. In the first scenario, he does so 'accidentally' -- in this case, we would typically excuse his act; we would say he's not responsible for what he did. In the second scenario, he kicks me on purpose -- in this case, we would blame him for the act; we would say he's responsible. Let us call that faculty which is absent in the first case and present in the second 'free will'.

There are two things to notice about these arguments. Neither one presumes anything about the nature of free will -- neither the compatibilist and libertarian positions contradict these observations, at least on their face. But note also that if you deny the existence of free will; if you argue that it's all just causality, you will have, at least, a difficult time distinguishing between the cases where we assign moral responsibility and the cases we don't.

06-02-2004, 06:57 AM	#43 (permalink)
asaris Mad Philosopher Location: Washington, DC	Nice rhetoric, alkaloid, but I don't see the argument. It seems to me to be rather clear that we have free will, in some sense of the word. Consider the two following arguments. 1. It is clear that we have moral responsibility for some of our actions. Yet some actions, which we might otherwise consider to be immoral, we excuse with language like "He was forced to". Now, leaving out cases where the 'compulsion' is merely coercion, it is rather easy to come up with cases where, in ordinary language, we'd describe the agent in question as acting against their will. We typically view this as exculpatory. Let us by stipulation call that feature, which ascribes to some acts moral responsibility and which excuses other acts when it is being acted against, free will. 2. Consider two scenarios where a man on the subway kicks my shin. In the first scenario, he does so 'accidentally' -- in this case, we would typically excuse his act; we would say he's not responsible for what he did. In the second scenario, he kicks me on purpose -- in this case, we would blame him for the act; we would say he's responsible. Let us call that faculty which is absent in the first case and present in the second 'free will'. There are two things to notice about these arguments. Neither one presumes anything about the nature of free will -- neither the compatibilist and libertarian positions contradict these observations, at least on their face. But note also that if you deny the existence of free will; if you argue that it's all just causality, you will have, at least, a difficult time distinguishing between the cases where we assign moral responsibility and the cases we don't. __________________ "Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht." "The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm." -- Friedrich Nietzsche