Disable inline images and image hosting
 

Reason:
http://metatalk.metafilter.com/mefi/12920
http://www.metafilter.com/mefi/55720

Example (I made the IMG tag not work -- remove the spaces, and something neat happens):
[ img ]http://tinyurl.com/fwzbm[ /img ]

well, that probably wouldn't work. But the IMG tag above would cause your browser to do a HTTP GET request on the link:
http://tinyurl.com/fwzbm
which is
http://collect.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=signout
which signs you out of myspace. As that isn't a valid image, you don't see anything visible.

Any website that uses unvalidated GETs to change state (yes, that is against the RFCs, but people do it)....

...

And, as an aside, if TFP hosts user-generated images, someone can use flash and a cutely-written GIF (or other) file to have a browser run arbitrary POST and GET operations, using the user's state, on TFP.

In effect you fool the browser into thinking a GIF file is a crossdomain.xml instruction that states "TFP accepts cross domain flash POSTs and GETs from any website", then get flash to do arbitrary gets/posts on TFP.

Worse, the flash can munge the headers all it wants, so you can't check by referrer.

To prevent this attack, you have to not host images that hostile people can upload. Or you could check and try to make sure the images don't contain crossdomain.xml instructions...

You can reduce this attack by making sure that user-submitted hosted images are hosted in a unique and deep subdirectory, or on a different domain. Then the attack applies to the subdirectory or the different domain only.

Just thought you would like to know!

Note that the first problem (images can cause GET requests) is mainly a problem for other websites -- it appears that TFP adds randomized tokens to the end of state-changing GET requests (and, more importantly, checks to see if they are there -- myspace has such a token, but it seems to ignore it...).

So linking of images is less important -- however, it does mean that I could, say, have any metafilter reader mark a post of mine on metafilter as their favorate without them realizing it.

The "crossdomain.xml" image attack is new, and more dangerous. In effect, with a hostile hosted image, a flash application on another website can do arbitrary user actions (or moderator actions, if a moderator looks at the flash app) on TFP.

I know you won’t believe me but this is true……I was not aware of image hosting. Yesterday my little nephew was doing his homework; I offered him help and he asked me to give the extensions for images. As I only know about jpeg so I told him so but my nephew told me that the questions demands 2 answers hence I took his textbook to search for the answer. When I was reading his book, I came to know that there are image hosting sites like http://www.uploadit.org or http://2and2.net that act as a store for your pictures. Isn’t it pretty cool?

Has a mod taken a look at Yakk's detailed explanation of something tthat, I think, would be harmful to the site :expressionless:

just a heads-up... oh, and buggy, welcome to the age of discovery, my friend. :)

It's never been a problem before; TFP isn't exactly a high-profile target and those who would attack us are well known, whether banned, active, or using alter egos.

It's fairly simple to block third-party GET and POST requests, I'll mention it and see if the admins want to make changes.