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The New American Militarism: Do You Advocate More of It, Or a Pullback?

I was surprised to see this article on Paul Wolfowitz, by Andrew J. Bacevich in the June 6th issues of The American Conservative. It prompted me to start a thread to attract posts of opinions about your expectations. Are you getting what you expected from U.S. military activity of the last 42 months? Do you want to see more of it or less of it? Do you believe that it is strengthening our security or weakening it? Is this militarism justified or worth the costs? What do you want to see accomplished militarily in the next two years?

Quote:

http://amconmag.com/2005_06_06/article1.html
Trigger Man

In Paul Wolfowitz, messianic vision meets faith in the efficacy of force.
by Andrew J. Bacevich
.....As the end of the 20th century approached, Providence was clearly summoning the United States to rule. Yet for Wolfowitz, the summons to rule complemented rather than transcended America’s prior mission to redeem. If the New Rome, the United States also remained the New Jerusalem. As Wolfowitz saw it, the possession of great military power facilitated the merger of these seemingly antipathetic roles. America’s interests and American ideology were becoming indistinguishable.

One prospective result would be to free American statesmen from ever again aligning the United States with Stalin to defeat Hitler or with Mao to check Brezhnev. Never again would raison d’etat oblige presidents to soil themselves by associating with execrable tin-pot dictators. Through military power, the United States could recapture the innocence sullied in the aftermath of the nation’s rise to great-power status. An American-dominated military revolution could revive American Exceptionalism and disprove Niebuhr.............

................The inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001 positioned newly appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to advocate these ideas where advocacy counted most.

For Wolfowitz, therefore, the unspeakable tragedy of 9/11 also signified a unique opportunity, which he quickly seized. Urging that the global war against terror be recast as a global war on behalf of freedom, he placed himself in the vanguard of those calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. A war to liberate Iraq promised to change the face of American grand strategy. By irrevocably committing the United States to a broader and heavily militarized campaign aimed at liberating the entire Islamic world, it would signify the triumph of principles that Wolfowitz had long espoused.

But for that triumph to occur, the war needed to happen. In this sense, the yearnings for a peaceful resolution expressed by Wolfowitz and other senior Bush administration officials during the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom surely qualify as disingenuous. The object of the exercise was never to disarm Saddam peacefully. The aim was always to demonstrate the invincibility of American arms, thereby resetting in a fundamental way the international correlation of power globally, and especially in the Islamic world. Violence as such was a sine qua non, its use expected to endow the United States with greater reserves of leverage, influence, and respect....................

.....................Never has a deputy cabinet secretary played such a visible role in making the case for a policy so fraught with controversy. Cool, imperturbable, and relentlessly “on message,” Wolfowitz performed impressively. Only once did his mask of self-assurance slip: when the United States Army, in the person of its chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, ventured to say nay.

The clash between Shinseki and Wolfowitz received considerable media coverage. For some, it lives on as emblematic of the arrogance and over-confidence attributed to the Bush administration on the eve of war. But the full significance of this civil-military confrontation remains unappreciated. For Shinseki, an honorable soldier with few intellectual pretensions, was also in his own way the embodiment of specific forces, very much at odds with those that Wolfowitz had championed. Although couching his critique in green-eyeshade, bean-counting terms, the general set out to subvert the very project that represented the deputy defense secretary’s life’s work.

The administration, Shinseki told members of Congress, was badly underestimating the number of troops that pacifying Iraq was likely to require. Given that the requisite additional troops simply did not exist, Shinseki was implicitly arguing that the U.S. armed services were inadequate for the enterprise. Further, he was implying that invasion was likely to produce something other than a crisp, tidy decision; from a soldier’s viewpoint, a display of precision warfare was not likely to settle the matter. “Liberation” would leave loose ends. Unexpected and costly complications would abound.

In effect, Shinseki was offering a last-ditch defense of the military tradition that Wolfowitz was intent on destroying, a tradition that saw armies as fragile, that sought to husband military power, and that classified force as an option of last resort. The risks of action, Shinseki was suggesting, were far, far greater than the advocates for war had let on.

Shinseki’s critique elicited an immediate retaliatory response. One could safely ignore the complaints of liberal Democrats or the New York Times, not to mention those coming from a largely inchoate antiwar movement. But if the brass openly opposed the war, they could halt the march on Baghdad even before it began. Besides, how could Shinseki dare even to raise the question of an occupation? Wolfowitz was already on the record as declaring that the United States was “committed to liberating the people of Iraq, not to becoming an occupation force.” Shinseki had to be discredited then and there, lest the opportunity to validate the new American way of war be lost forever.

So the normally unflappable Wolfowitz responded with uncharacteristic brusqueness, caustically dismissing the general’s estimate as “wildly off the mark.” For his dissent, Shinseki paid dearly. Publicly rebuked and immediately marginalized, he soon retired, his fate an object lesson for other senior military professionals. (The episode affirmed the Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz theory of civil-military relations: heap lavish public praise on soldiers in the ranks while keeping the generals and admirals on an exceedingly short leash.)

In the end, Wolfowitz got his war. Operation Iraqi Freedom provided the first salvo in an open-ended campaign to transform the Islamic world. Should the conduct of that campaign require the anticipatory use of force, it also provided ample precedent to do just that.

Two years later, Wolfowitz has won a promotion, having been elevated to the presidency of the World Bank. From this even more prominent position, he vows to bring to the eradication of global poverty the same energy that he demonstrated in revitalizing war. According to the standard Washington metric, his appointment qualifies as a triumphal vindication not only of the man but also of the policies he represents.

The contrast with the fate of his chief antagonist could hardly be more vivid. General Shinseki has all but vanished. In an age when senior officers with scores to settle typically vent their spleen by publishing self-exculpatory memoirs or becoming political partisans, Shinseki, ever the traditionalist, has maintained a studied silence. Immensely generous to Wolfowitz, fate has seemingly treated Shinseki unfairly.

Yet this immediate accounting deceives. A balanced assessment of Wolfowitz’s legacy must note that he leaves behind unfinished business and unresolved questions related to precisely those matters about which he cared most: the political utility and moral implications of military power. The forces that he represented and the events that he helped set in motion have yielded at best mixed results.

In its trial run, the doctrine of preventive war—Wolfowitz’s handiwork as much as the president’s—has produced liberation and occupation, a crisp demonstration of “shock and awe” and a protracted, debilitating insurgency, the dramatic toppling of a dictator and horrifying evidence implicating American soldiers in torture and other abuses. The Iraq War has now entered its third year with no end in sight, taxing U.S. forces to the limit. The ongoing conflict has divided the nation like no event since Vietnam. Like Vietnam, it is sapping our economic strength and has already done immeasurable damage to our standing in the world. Despite expectations of Saddam’s overthrow paving the way for what some expected to be a foreign policy of moral incandescence, the United States finds itself obliged once again to compromise its ideals, cozying up to little Saddams like Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov.

The forces that Paul Wolfowitz helped unleash—a dangerous combination of hubris and naïveté—are exacting an ever mounting cost. His considerable exertions notwithstanding, truth in matters of statecraft remains implacably gray. Even assuming honorable intentions on the part of those who conceived this war, wielding power in Iraq has left the United States up to its ankles, if not up to its knees, in guilt.

In his solitude, General Shinseki can await the final judgment of history with considerable confidence. At the pinnacle of professional success, Paul Wolfowitz must look forward to a different verdict that will be anything but kind.

http://www.antiwar.com/engelhardt/?articleid=5625
........War, in fact, is increasingly the American way of life and, to a certain extent, it's almost as if no one notices.

Well, not quite no one. Andrew J. Bacevich has written a book on militarism, American-style, of surpassing interest. Just published, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195173384/antiwarbookstore/">The New American Militarism, How Americans Are Seduced by War</a> would be critical reading no matter who wrote it. But coming from Bacevich, a West Point graduate, Vietnam veteran, former contributor to such magazines as the Weekly Standard and the National Review, and former Bush Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin, it has special resonance.

Bacevich, a self-professed conservative, has clearly been a man on a journey. He writes that he still situates himself "culturally on the Right. And I continue to view the remedies proffered by mainstream liberalism with skepticism. But my disenchantment with what passes for mainstream conservatism, embodied in the present Bush administration and its groupies, is just about absolute. Fiscal irresponsibility, a buccaneering foreign policy, a disregard for the Constitution, the barest lip service as a response to profound moral controversies: these do not qualify as authentically conservative values. On this score my views have come to coincide with the critique long offered by the radical Left: it is the mainstream itself, the professional liberals as well as the professional conservatives who define the problem."

I've long recommended Chalmers Johnson's book on American militarism and military-basing policy, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0805077979/antiwarbookstore/">The Sorrows of Empire.</a> Bacevich's The New American Militarism, which focuses on the ways Americans have become enthralled by, and found themselves in thrall to, military power and the idea of global military supremacy, should be placed right beside it in any library. Below, you'll find the first of two long excerpts from the book, slightly adapted and posted with the kind permission of the author and of his publisher, Oxford University Press. This one introduces Bacevich's thoughts on the ways in which, since the Vietnam War, our country has been militarized, a development to which, as he writes, the events of September 11 only added momentum. On Friday, I'll post an excerpt on the second-generation neoconservatives and what they contributed to our new militarism.

An excerpt from <a href="http://www.antiwar.com/engelhardt/?articleid=5625">The New American Militarism, How Americans Are Seduced by War</a>
"In public life today, paying homage to those in uniform has become obligatory and the one unforgivable sin is to be found guilty of failing to "support the troops." In the realm of partisan politics, the political Right has shown considerable skill in exploiting this dynamic, shamelessly pandering to the military itself and by extension to those members of the public laboring under the misconception, a residue from Vietnam, that the armed services are under siege from a rabidly anti-military Left.

In fact, the Democratic mainstream – if only to save itself from extinction – has long since purged itself of any dovish inclinations. "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about," Madeleine Albright demanded of General Colin Powell, "if we can't use it?" As Albright's question famously attests, when it comes to advocating the use of force, Democrats can be positively gung ho. Moreover, in comparison to their Republican counterparts, they are at least as deferential to military leaders and probably more reluctant to question claims of military expertise.

Even among Left-liberal activists, the reflexive anti-militarism of the 1960s has given way to a more nuanced view. Although hard-pressed to match self-aggrandizing conservative claims of being one with the troops, progressives have come to appreciate the potential for using the armed services to advance their own agenda."..............

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I want the best outcome for my country, especially for our countrymen in uniform. I do not know what to advise as the next step, or over the next two years, because I do not believe that the president or his associates have openly and truthfully communicated the current military policy and goals.
Until I see them willing to trust us with this information, I have to advocate an end to militarism and a rapid withdrawal of our troops from Iraq. Our military has failed to secure Iraqi infrastructure, or a six mile length of road to Baghdad airport and cannot seem to protect it's own members,
and certainly not the Iraqi people. The presence of our troops seems to serve as a catalyst for further violence.

IF we continue to have jobs that pay shit and cut educational grants and spending.... then of course the military becomes a huge option and the best part is.... a "draft" won't be necessary. This has been IMHO a plan from day 1 with Bush. It's not about winning Iraq (that's just a "practice")....

My fear (and paranoidal as it may seem to some) is that our military build up is to take offense against those countries we have trade deficits against (China, Japan, Europe). Hence the new found patriotism and "you are either with us or against us" talk.

Whether or not my fears are just me or true..... one glaring thing is very obvious.... the greed and total disregard of our troops is heavy in "contracting" companies..... that take money and are slow on the provisions.... or overcharge for fuel and so on... and the fact that our troops are not as well trained as we want to believe.

But the biggest tell of how this administration truly feels should be obvious in the talk about the "we love our veterans" as they close VA hospitals, take away retiree benefits and treat the vets like crap. Very telling.

Why do you think we give out ritilin and war games are always #1 sellers and we go to great lengths to decry sex on television and in movies but violence (and the gruesomer the better) in movies and televion is ok? It's called desensitizing.

Also why do you think all these "anti-depressents" hurt sex drives so much? It's all about control and getting people ready for combat and take away true emotions.....

Of course I'm just paranoid that way..... or is there fact behind this paranoia???????

DRAFT TRUMP IN '08............DRAFT TRUMP IN '08............DRAFT TRUMP IN '08

Shenseki's concerns clearly have been vindicated with the present day situations in Iraq and Afganistan. Current military leadership has repeatedly warned that our volunteer military is stretched dangerously thin and that enlistment of new recruits is well short of the mark to simply sustain current numbers. It was recently stated by another military source that we can't expect to be out of Iraq within the next eight years.

A question I would like to add to Host's list is can we continue this administration's military policy? I don't believe we can.

If these issues are accurate, the most important thing I believe we should be looking at is how the administration intends to withdraw from Iraq and Afganistan, if at all. Information of that kind has not been forthcoming.

It would appear that a majority of Americans are becoming war weary and their representatives are feeling the pressure. I confess that over the last decade I have become increasing cynical about the motivations of both political parties and this article doesn't tell me otherwise.

Bush is not up for reelection, but many members of congress are. Although I applaud any effort toward accountability about the reasons for entering this war and how we intend to remove our troups, I view the article with a great deal of skepticism.

More in Congress Want Iraq Exit Strategy
By Susan Milligan
The Boston Globe

Saturday 11 June 2005

Unease grows as war backing falls.

Washington - Faced with plummeting public support for the war in Iraq, a growing number of members of Congress from both parties are reevaluating the reasons for the invasion and demanding the Bush administration produce a plan for withdrawing US troops.

A bipartisan group of House members is drafting a resolution that calls on the administration to present a strategy for getting the United States out of Iraq, reflecting an increasing restlessness about the war in a chamber that 2 1/2 years ago voted overwhelmingly to support the use of force in Iraq.

The House International Relations Committee on Thursday approved a similar proposal, 32 to 9, with strong bipartisan support. Sponsored by Representative Joseph Crowley, a New York Democrat who voted to authorize force in Iraq in 2002, the proposal represents the first time a congressional committee has moved to demand steps be taken so that US troops can start coming home.

More than 100 Democrats - including 11 who voted for the war resolution - have signed onto a letter to President Bush requesting an explanation of the so-called Downing Street memo, a British document that charges the administration planned to go to war even without hard evidence of the presence of weapons of mass destruction.

The proposed resolutions would not have the force of law, if approved by the House and Senate. But the actions reflect discontent among lawmakers in both parties who are hearing constituent complaints about the war's escalating body counts and uncertain end.

Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina, a conservative Republican who voted to authorize force, said his district is growing weary of a war that has cost the lives of more than 1,600 US troops and left more than 12,000 wounded.

"I'm hearing: 'How much do we have to do? We're giving blood. We're giving money. What is the final chapter for our involvement?' I think people are looking to the administration for an explanation, whether we have done all we can do," said Jones, whose district is home to 60,000 retired military personnel.

Jones said he felt misled by the administration on the reasons for the war because no weapons of mass destruction have been found. "If I knew [then] what I knew today, I would not have voted for the resolution," Jones said.

Representative Marty Meehan, a Lowell Democrat who also voted for the war resolution, said he and some Democratic colleagues are working with five to 10 House Republicans on a resolution calling for an exit strategy to ease the United States out of Iraq. He said he hoped to get the support of 25 or more Republicans, despite the fact that only six voted against the war resolution.

"The war is going terribly," Meehan said. "It's due to a lack of a plan to win the peace. Mistakes have been piling up."

The administration has consistently said that the military is making progress in Iraq, noting successes in rounding up insurgents. Representative Duncan Hunter, a California Republican who is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said he rejects the idea of forcing the administration to lay out a clear exit strategy because it "sends a message" that the United States is not committed to finishing the job in Iraq.

"There is an exit strategy, and it's the shoring up of the Iraqi guard and a military force capable of protecting Iraq and its people," he said. "That cannot be fitted to a precise calendar."

But other lawmakers who voted for the Iraq war said their constituents are getting restless. A Washington Post/ ABC poll this week showed support for the war dropping dramatically, with nearly two-thirds of Americans surveyed saying that the United States has gotten "bogged down" in Iraq, compared with 41 percent in August 2003.

Representative Harold Ford, a centrist Democrat who also voted for the war, said his constituents in military-friendly Tennessee are clamoring to have their loved ones in Iraq brought home, and are growing increasingly skeptical about the future of the mission there.

While they supported the war initially, Tennessee voters have begun to express "a lot of frustration" about the duration of the mission and the number of casualties, said Ford, who recently returned from a trip to Iraq. "The president has to start sharing with the American people how long we are going to be there."

Some Democrats want a definite timeline for withdrawing, while others continue to berate the administration and their own colleagues for backing an invasion antiwar lawmakers believe was based on faulty or exaggerated intelligence.

Many Republicans are reluctant to criticize the president, while some Democrats who voted for the war are nervous about being lumped together with two of their party's most prominent antiwar figures - House minority leader Nancy Pelosi of California and Democratic National Committee chairman Howard Dean.

"Many of the Democrats who voted for the resolution authorizing the use of force do not want to be perceived as weak on national security, and those who voted against the resolution somehow think it's someone else's problem," Meehan said.

Still, despite lingering differences over the decision to go to war, a consensus has been growing among lawmakers in both parties - and on both sides of the war resolution - that the United States is in danger of getting mired in a protracted, costly conflict, Crowley said.

"I think the amendment sends a clear message that both sides, for the first time, are saying the situation in Iraq is not OK," Crowley said of the International Relations Committee's resolution, which drew support from 13 Republicans and 19 Democrats. "What I'm trying to do is create an umbrella we can all get under."

I'm sorry, but this strikes me as nothing more than running for political cover by both parties. These issues should have been addressed long ago.

Host why would you be surprised?

The American conservative reflects the philosophy of 1920's isolationist dogma. You know the same dogma that, if it weren't for Pearl Harbor, would have let the Nazi's control all of Europe.

The troops leave when they are able to leave without destroying the Iraqi's peoples chance for freedom and our reputation for the next 50 years.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Ustwo

The troops leave when they are able to leave without destroying the Iraqi's peoples chance for freedom and our reputation for the next 50 years.

I have to agree with Ustwo on this one. If the US left now, there would be a disaster in Iraq, America's position on the world would be even more damaged and, perhaps most chillingly, terrorists would believe they could "win" by simply letting off enough road side bombs or driving suicide bombs into markets.

I originally supported the war. When I learned that the US had been planning it for years and noticed all the disinformation that was being produced, I withdrew my support. Whilst I don't necessarily believe the invasion was a crime, it was certainly a crime against common sense (in retrospect of course!).

But to withdraw now would be the worst decision. You're there now. Finish the job as much as possible, and withdraw in a controlled manner. I don't want to see TV pictures of helicopters leaving the roof of the US embassy in Iraq, with pathetic souls clinging on for dear life...

Mr Mephisto

I honestly think we may have passed the f$cked no matter what point in that country. we have no hope of a meaningful multinational reconstruction, and the insurgency was allowed to grow and fester in the critical first months. all the stupid grandstanding cost us time we didn't have, and by the time the UN withdrew after the bagdad bombing...

i really don't know if it is possible to salvage the situation in iraq. our troop levels are too low to keep order, but the occupation already is straining our military to the seams. the UK is pulling it's troops home or to afganistan (which is on the brink of total collapse...)

it's pretty scary to me, but i think the cause of a free and democratic iraq may have been f$cked over.

Hmmmm....well I have to admit right off the bat that I can't stand the deaths of innocent civilians. That goes without saying. I also don't like the idea of any countries troops stationed on and around natural resources. I REALLY don't like that fact that I lost someone I know in the army to Iraqi freedom fighters/insurgents. John, you will be missed. I lastly don't like that (speaking from second hand experience) many of the soldiers on the ground half way around the world have some good training in things like tactics and weapons, but little training in philosophy, history, and science. To quote my grandfather, a career army man, "A soldier has to be a renaissance man. He has to know both war and peace, and when each is appropriate."

On the flip side, I am overjoyed that Sadam will finally be brought to justice. I have hope that it is more likely that we will see peace in Iraq if the military and government play it right. Throught all of this, my main concerns are that the citizens of Iraq can rule themselves through peace and hardships, and that our government can learn that policing the world can include not only violence but negotiations. If we can learn from our mistakes, we have a chance to help many people.

In the end, I would like to see the handing over of resources FIRST, to show that the war wasn't about oil, but freedom. I would like us to pull back and try to communicate with those who want us to leave, not simply kill or capture them for turture.

Mr. Host, great thread. One question: I understand you feel the US should withdraw immediately on the grounds that the US has failed one of its missions; to secure the area and protect the people (I just want to make sure I understood you correctly).

I know you said you have no ideas for the next step, but wouldn't an immediate US troop withdrawal be detrimental to Iraq? (i.e. - more violence, less security ect) and thus worsen the situation? Do you think that the presence of US troops would be worse than the absence? What dou you think should then take the place of the US troops? Wouldn't it be better to have the US "finish" the job first?

Mr. Mephisto: So far the discussion has been oriented around US action. What do you think about Australian presence (UK et al) in Iraq? Should the rest of the "caolition" forces withdraw and let the US "do its own laundry" or should they stick around and help out? How does that affect the situation? US mess, international clean up?

P.S. - How's the new place in Perth?

Will, interesting thoughts there, I like your idea of the Renaissance man. It reminds me of what Thucydides said about philospher -soldiers. Same with Plato too I think (Maybe Roachboy can verify).

Do you think the natural resources should be guarded by the Iraqis instead? The consideration is they aren't trained enough or qualified. Or maybe an international force. Presumably, the resources still need to be guarded right? I like your idea of handing over resources as a goodwill gesture and show of good faith. However, the main problem of securing the area and stabilizing it still remains.

My position (in short and simply stated) is that the US made a mess, the US needs to clean it up. Personally, I also fall into the group of people that think we shouldn't have gone in the first place, but we can't unring the bell. IMO, we should at least "do the right thing" (subjective, I know) and fix the situation first. I believe that securing the area (for all) and stability is the main priority, then we (the US) can scram.

Quote:

Originally Posted by martinguerre

But what do you think should be done then? Adding more US troops? Making a real committment? We can't very well just let Iraq "go to pieces" can we? Is it really too late?

Quote:

Originally Posted by jorgelito

But what do you think should be done then? Adding more US troops? Making a real committment? We can't very well just let Iraq "go to pieces" can we? Is it really too late?

If we had more troops to add, that might help. But sadly...short of severely compromising other commitments, we cannot. The post-"victory" period was critical...it was when we needed to quickly restore order, services, and set up a care-taker government.

Our incompetence in that moment, two long years ago, has created the space for the insurgency. With every passing moment, it gets more difficult to contain them. Now, i don't think we could pay the tab if we wanted to.

The current number of troops is not stabilizing the country. The number of attacks is still rising, and no substantial progress has been made in containing either international terrorism or sectarian tensions.

We do not have any more spare "boots on the ground." To increase troop levels will require either a draft or the removal of troops from another critical positions. Afganistan is in an especially precarious situation...Korea isn't much calmer these days.

As a nation, we lack the resolve to institute a draft, and recruiting has failed to produce a volenteer army big enough to do the job its being asked to do.

As unsettling and sorrowing a prospect as this is...this is my reasoning for saying that Iraq may be screwed beyond repair at this point in history.

i posted a memo that has emerged about the bushworld run-up to the war in iraq in another thread--the "positive dvelopements in iraq" on--the link to it is here:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...100723_pf.html

the fiasco that has been and is unfolding in iraq has to be linked directly to the bush administration itself--they had no plan. they apparently beleived the wolfowitz scenario for the war--and why wouldnt they--had it been connected in any way to reality, it would have required no plan, just invasion, triumph, get covered with flowers, do a few things and leave.

the point is that thousands and thousands of people--in and out of militaries---are now dead because of the incompetence and arrogance of this administration. that there is no real demand on the part of the public that this administration be held to account for this farce is shocking to me.

iraq could well be sliding toward civil war as a direct result of the incompetence of this administration.

i would think that such a disaster will become a matter for deep consideration by subsequent administrations--unless and endless chain of bush-like people get elected---which seems beyond unlikely. i think that a disaster like this will prompt deep reviews of process and will probably end up in the generation of different types of obstacles that would prevent any future administration from lying to itself by wrapping information around policy desires from the outset. i would think that this will raise profound questions about every dimension of the present reconfiguration of the military, from the reliance on contractors through the routinization of torture, from tactics to armaments. and perhaps a move away from the conservative fetishism of the corporate model of governance, which is top-down, operating with no necessary checks on the actions of the officers, without democratic processes built in, without the requirement for them.

what is clear is that this model is not adequately hedged round with safeguards to prevent the worst possible types of consequences following from idiots ascending to the helm.

there is no easy way out in part because of the mess--but the mess is the fault of the united states, of the administration running the show--they clearly had no idea what they were getting into, no understanding of or concern for the type of complexity they would be facing. no plan, no plan.

Quote:

Originally Posted by jorgelito

Will, interesting thoughts there, I like your idea of the Renaissance man. It reminds me of what Thucydides said about philospher -soldiers. Same with Plato too I think (Maybe Roachboy can verify).

Do you think the natural resources should be guarded by the Iraqis instead? The consideration is they aren't trained enough or qualified. Or maybe an international force. Presumably, the resources still need to be guarded right? I like your idea of handing over resources as a goodwill gesture and show of good faith. However, the main problem of securing the area and stabilizing it still remains.

We have plenty if experience guarding resources in places not belonging to us, but that doesnn't make it right. It's not our oil. At the end of the day, the oil, the land, the culture still belongs to someone else. We should be helping them rebuild their econemy, not helping ourselves. The administration keeps cramming the words 'freedom' and 'rebuilding' down our throats. If we want Iraq to be a successful and liberated nation in the future, we need to ensure their economic stability by helping them to develop the means to produce and export oil by thenmselves. This includes everytrhing from chemistry in schools, to security training. This is all hypothetical, because the way things are going, our military will be there for a very long time.

In the real world, what we should be doing is investing our $200 billion in as many foreign companies as American companies. If we can jump start buisnesses in the middle east, we can build a larger economic safty net throughtout the whole reigion. In the long run, we would help relations and make them more likely to deal with us when we are in need of oil in the future. Kill them with kindness, not semiautomatic weapons and humvees.

Quote:

Originally Posted by jorgelito

My position (in short and simply stated) is that the US made a mess, the US needs to clean it up. Personally, I also fall into the group of people that think we shouldn't have gone in the first place, but we can't unring the bell. IMO, we should at least "do the right thing" (subjective, I know) and fix the situation first. I believe that securing the area (for all) and stability is the main priority, then we (the US) can scram.

Well what do we doi now that the bell is rung?

Quote:

Originally Posted by jorgelito

Mr. Mephisto: So far the discussion has been oriented around US action. What do you think about Australian presence (UK et al) in Iraq? Should the rest of the "caolition" forces withdraw and let the US "do its own laundry" or should they stick around and help out? How does that affect the situation? US mess, international clean up?

The majority of Australians oppose the use of Australian troops in Iraq. Before the recent election, Howard promised no further troops would be sent there. Once re-elected he promptly broke his promise and sent another 470 troops. Surprise surprise.

With regards so whether the rest of the coalition should withdraw or not, I'm not really sure. The fact that the US snubbed the UN and the majority of the international community means that not many other countries would be willing to help out. It's a very unfortunate state of affairs.

Quote:

P.S. - How's the new place in Perth?

Hah! Not bad. Just got my house plans finished and submitted for approval. Still renting at the moment. Perth is nice. Laid back and easy going.

I miss Sydney and Dublin though... :(

Mr Mephisto

Well, I'm not an expert, but IMO, I think that the US should:

1. Security - Commit more troops, up to at least 250,000 - 500,000 to secure the area: roads, towns etc. Perhaps adopting the UK model of "softly,softly" where appropriate will help. Simultaneously, train the Iraqi troop, a civilian police force, and an Iraqi Officer Corps (this is especially important - Iraq needs good leadership and management, preferably home grown).

There are a few ways they could do it:
"Walking the beat" - Joint US-Iraqi patrols, engaging the community. Establish civilian "watch" or patrols too. Key is, you have to involve the locals and show them how to do it, train etc.

Criticisms: The US doesn't have enough troops, overextended. Costs too much.

True, but we spilled the milk, we got to clean up. We'll have to bite the bullet and reduce in other areas. NATO can supply troops in Afghanistan, we could pull troops from there and they have experience. Up recruitment: Show them the money. Up the bonuses, yeah the cost will hurt but that's the price we gotta pay to wipe our asses. Otherwise, "bribe" our "allies", mend fences. Offer consessions if they agree to deploy their troops. Example, France gets to build roads in exchange for supplying 25,000 troops etc. Germany gets to rebuild the airport if they supply 25,000 troops, barracks, and a medical corps. Japan gets the telecom contract if they supply 10,000 engineers/support units whatever, I don't know.

Draft is NOT a good idea (IMO).

2. Reconstruction - Open bidding for rebuilding/reconstruction efforts to more companies and involve more Iraqis in the effort. For example, why are we paying some kid from Iowa $100,000 (hypothetical, not empirical) to drive a truck? Wouldn't it be better to hire an Iraqi for considerably less and he is gainfully employed.

The sooner the Iraqis are involved in their own rebuilding, the sooner they will have a stake. With a stake, they will be less tolerant of "rotten apples" trying to ruin it for the rest of them. Example, Iraqi shopkeeper who got sick and tired of insurgents disrupting their business, in a moment to make the NRA proud, grabbed their own guns and fought back.

Regarding the issue of funding and open bidding: Perhaps a system of priority or percentage to go to Coalition allies as a "reward" (the lion's share etc.).

Or if you want to go international, then fine, but everyone has to pony up for the bill then too.

So perhaps a compromise: France, Germany, et al: You want contracts? YOu want bids? Ok, then please also contribute to the bill and/or troops to either help train Iraqis, or patrol. Or debt relief too if you want, but you gotta pay if you want to play. I think it's only fair (insofar as it's possible or reasonable) to the American taxpayer.

Criticisms: The US did all the hard work, therefore the US and coalition allies should reap the rewards (as in fat contracts and bids). True, but we're not really in a good position here are we. We need to be more pragmatic and stop playing games. We need to use our good ol fashioned Yankee ingenuity and outside-of-the-box thinking. We can all come out winners (in theory) if we make a concerted effort at cooperation, compromise and good will. Spreading the wealth around and open bidding should help keep prices under control, give allies and potential allies more incentive to cooperate, gives everyone a stake in the success of Iraq instead of waiting around to watch the US get egg on its face. "What's in it for me" can be utilized here. Give and take. At least I hope so...

3. Administration - Either have the Iraqis take over all affairs themselves with the US providing security and create an "advisory panel" with no executive powers, consulting only. Or have some sort of "neutral" entity oversee the state-building process. Martinguerre and Roachboy are correct about the US "planners" not having an exit strategy nor a governance plan either. The US armed forces is very good at what it's supposed to do. Break and destroy stuff, fight bad guys. But it's not good at doing stuff it's not intended for. Occupation, civil administration. So, let the "office geeks" do their jobs and govern.

Criticisms: How can the US ensure its interests if it cedes controls to others? Well, that's a good concern. We have to start somewhere right? We said we were there to liberate them so let's do that. IMO, no one in their right mind would try and "screw" the US. Everyone already knows we have military might. I suppose the cynical view is, if our interest aren't being considered, we could always steamroll back in there. So, we just have to let them run their own country. They know we're watching (this sounds bad I know, but I'm running out of ideas, LOL!)

Sh*t, I have to get back to studying. I hope y'all enjoyed "my two cents". Agree or disagree, maybe you got a good laugh too. Well, guys how about it?

The bell may have already been rung, but we can make music, Will!

Excellent contribution, Jorgelito.

It would appear that the military leadership on the ground is calling for diplomatic efforts because the military solution is not working:

Officers Say Arms Can't End Iraq War
By Tom Lasseter
Knight Ridder Newspapers

Monday 13 June 2005

Shiites, Sunnis must find solution to insurgency, US commanders warn.

Baghdad - A growing number of senior American military officers in Iraq have concluded that there is no long-term military solution to an insurgency that has killed thousands of Iraqis and more than 1,700 U.S. military personnel during the past two years.

Instead, officers say, the only way to end the guerrilla war is through Iraqi politics -- an arena that so far has been crippled by divisions between Shiite Muslims, whose coalition dominated the January elections, and Sunni Muslims, who are a minority in Iraq but form the base of support for the insurgency.

"I think the more accurate way to approach this right now is to concede that... this insurgency is not going to be settled, the terrorists and the terrorism in Iraq is not going to be settled, through military options or military operations," Brig. Gen. Donald Alston, the chief U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said last week, in a comment that echoes what other senior officers say. "It's going to be settled in the political process."

Gen. George W. Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, expressed similar sentiments, calling the military's efforts "the Pillsbury Doughboy idea" -- pressing the insurgency in one area only causes it to rise elsewhere.

"Like in Baghdad," Casey said during an interview with two newspaper reporters, including one from Knight Ridder, last week. "We push in Baghdad -- they're down to about less than a car bomb a day in Baghdad over the last week -- but in north-center (Iraq)... they've gone up," he said. "The political process will be the decisive element."

The recognition that a military solution is not in the offing has led U.S. and Iraqi officials to signal they are willing to negotiate with insurgent groups, or their intermediaries.

"It has evolved in the course of normal business," said a senior U.S. diplomatic official in Baghdad, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of U.S. policy to defer to the Iraqi government on Iraqi political matters. "We have now encountered people who at least claim to have some form of a relationship with the insurgency."

The message is markedly different from previous statements by U.S. officials who spoke of quashing the insurgency by rounding up or killing "dead enders" loyal to former dictator Saddam Hussein. As recently as two weeks ago, in a Memorial Day interview on CNN's Larry King Live, Vice President Dick Cheney said he believed the insurgency was in its "last throes."

But the violence has continued unabated, even though 44 of the 55 Iraqis portrayed in the military's famous "deck of cards" have been killed or captured, including Hussein.

`We can't kill them all'

Lt. Col. Frederick P. Wellman, who works with the task force overseeing the training of Iraqi security troops, said the insurgency doesn't seem to be running out of new recruits, a dynamic fueled by tribal members seeking revenge for relatives killed in fighting.

"We can't kill them all," Wellman said. "When I kill one I create three."

American officials had hoped that January's national elections would blunt the insurgency by giving the population hope for their political future. But so far, the political process has not in any meaningful way included Iraq's Sunni Arab population.

Most of Iraq's Sunni Arabs, motivated either by fear or boycott, did not vote, and they hold a scant 17 seats in the 275-member parliament.

With Shiites and Kurds stocking the nation's security forces with members of their militias, Sunni Arabs have been marginalized and, according to some analysts in Iraq, have become more willing to join armed groups.

U.S. officials prefer not to talk about the situation along religious lines, but they acknowledge that one of the key obstacles to resolving Iraq's problems is the difference between Sunni and Shiite religious institutions.

Shiites are organized around their marja'iya, a council of clerics -- led in Iraq by Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani -- that issues religious edicts that Shiite faithful follow as law. Sunnis, on the other hand, have no such unifying structure.

Unless Sunnis develop confidence that the government will represent them, few here see the insurgency fading.

Asked about the success in suppressing the insurgency in Baghdad recently -- the result of a series of large-scale raids that targeted primarily Sunni neighborhoods -- Alston said that he expects the violence to return.

"We have taken down factories, major cells, we have made good progress in (stopping) the production of (car bombs) in Baghdad," Alston said. "Now, do I think that there will be more (bombs) in Baghdad? Yes, I do."

Downing Street Memo II expressed concern that after "Mission Accomplished" the Secretary of Defense would remain in charge rather than the Secretary of State. With 20/20 hindsight, I believe they were correct.