Quote:
Originally Posted by Seaver
Host, having something unifying to fight against is not the same as having an immediate threat to national existence.
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I hear you, Seaver, and we do have something "unifying" to fight against.
It is an enemy that has infiltrated and undermined our governent, spending our money, successfully convincing you, that it is doing the opposite of undermining. The military and the executive branch it takes orders from, that so many have so much faith in as protectors of "our freedom", and "our rights", are hard at work attempting to gain lawful authority to try to control what we know and how we come to know it!:
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[PDF]
Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/. occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf] ..... modifyoutdated legislation, such as the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act that ...
italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33062.pdf -
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Heritage is pushing for government domestic disinformation distribution:
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http://mountainrunner.us/2007/12/her...mithmundt.html
Heritage on Smith-Mundt
By MountainRunner on December 10, 2007
I read through <a href="http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/bg2089.cfm">Juliana Geran Pilon's Smith-Mundt article</a> and I agree with <a href="http://kimelli.nfshost.com/index.php?id=2887">Kim Andrew Elliott's assessment</a> that it has little to do with Smith-Mundt (for background on Smith-Mundt, see my post at <a href="http://kimelli.nfshost.com/index.php?id=2887">Small Wars Journal</a>... part one and one-half is <a href="http://mountainrunner.us/2007/12/off_the_cuff_part_15_of_what_t.html">here</a>, part II is forthcoming).
While her intentions are laudable, her examples miss the point and her arguments conflate description of action with the action itself. In the end, she ironically she seems to be making the same arguments that brought about Smith-Mundt in the first place.
Most of what Pilon describes as caused by Smith-Mundt simply aren't. She raises the issue of fighting the information war within the U.S., but provides little evidence or argument on how Smith-Mundt has limited the domestic conversation. Indeed, she ignores the propaganda values of the Sunday talk show circuit and the Press Secretary's twice-daily pulpit.....
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The military and the Bush administration want to "modify" the law to warp and shape (control) ALL INFORMATION that is passed off to us as "news", and they do it outside the US, and to a degree, inside and now they openly are attempting to do it legally, domestically too.
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http://www.prweekus.com/Comms-pros-c...article/57436/
Comms pros consult on US military report
Ted McKenna
July 30, 2007
ARLINGTON, VA: The RAND Corporation consulted with a number of top PR and marketing experts when creating a recently released report urging the US military to think of itself as a brand that must ensure its communications are met with appropriate actions.
The $400,000 report, <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf">"Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation,"</a> which was commissioned by the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and is available at www.rand.org, discussed how the military could effectively use corporate branding and communications strategies and techniques for operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
Executives from Burson-Marsteller, Weber Shandwick, J.D. Power, the Rendon Group, and the Lincoln Group, among others; marketing professors at NYU and Northwestern; and various military experts aided the report.
The key message of the report, said lead author Todd Helmus, who is a clinical psychologist by training, but has spent the past three years studying lessons learned by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that like any corporate brand, the US military must make sure its actions match its words. Otherwise, it won't receive the trust or support of the ever-critical civilian population on which military operations ultimately depend.
"Our point in the report is that actions speak louder than words," Helmus said. "You can't build positive relationships with people in war zones by just saying good things. You have to do good things."
The report coincides with Congressional discussions over the 2008 defense appropriations bill, including debate over continued funding for the controversial Guantanamo military prison.
In practice, that means being as up-front as possible about, for instance, accidental civilian casualties or other mistakes that can potentially be used for propaganda purposes by the adversary. With the prevalence and immediacy of the Internet, that means a focus on online communications, which the report, as well as a number of PR experts, says has not been utilized as effectively as possible by the US military.
WS chairman Jack Leslie, who was consulted for the report, said the US government is increasingly willing to study best practices from the corporate world.
"Especially now, given the radical changes going on in the marketing world, there are all sorts of innovations happening in corporate marketing that the government would like to access," he added. "This is a convenient way to do it, and it doesn't require a big contract with individual agencies."
DBD Worldwide chairman Keith Reinhard, also consulted for the report, agreed that government agencies are embracing corporate communications principles, but he said funding for their adoption remains generally too low.
While insurgent forces in Iraq and elsewhere have done a good job projecting or "shaping" their global image via the use of multimedia online, including videos of "jihadis," cell phone messages, and even video games, US policies such as the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act - <h3>which prohibits the government from directing propaganda at US audiences - prevent the US military from engaging as extensively and effectively as it could with an online audience, </h3> said the report.
<h3>Paige Craig, ex-president and now a board member of the Lincoln Group</h3>, which is conducting polls in Iraq to study the attitudes and perceptions of Iraqis on rule of law, support for violent groups, and other issues, said US military adversaries have great propaganda.
"It doesn't look as flashy as something you'd find on Madison Avenue, but it's very effective," he said. <h2>"It's almost embarrassing to sit here and realize we've got the talent and ability to counter what the adversary makes; it's simply a matter of policy."</h2>
Helmus said that the new report, like others commissioned by the USJFCOM, will enter a process of evaluation to determine its merits and how recommendations can be tested and put into action.
A spokesperson for USJFCOM, which is tasked by the US Defense Department with "transforming" the US military through new technologies and practices, said officials were not immediately available to comment on the report.
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<h2>I, and others like me who find "stuff" like this and put it in front of your eyes are "The Adversary", that DOD paid propagandist, Paige Craig of the Lincoln Group was referring to, Seaver. Are you going to "unify" with me, or with Paige Craig, Lincoln Group, Rendon Group, George and Dick, and the republican party and the Council for National Policy?</h2>....because, this is it, Seaver, they're doing it, their admitting it, and you've swallowed their bullshit, up unitl now. Do you want to keep accepting/defending it, or do you want to join the opposition?
Quote:
http://www.prwatch.org/node/6306#comment-2324
Jul 31, 2007
Military Takes Aim at U.S. Propaganda Ban
Source: PR Week, July 30, 2007
In preparing its marketing study commissioned by the U.S. military, the RAND Corporation sought the advice of PR advisers including Burson-Marsteller, Weber Shandwick, J.D. Power, the Rendon Group, and the Lincoln Group.....
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Watch the video: http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Kucini...erup_0801.html
Read the transcript:
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http://kucinich.house.gov/News/Docum...cumentID=70646
Kucinich Challenges Rumsfeld on News Management of Iraq War;Raises Questions of Outside Contractors Painting A False Picture
Washington, Aug 1 - Congressman Dennis Kucinich aggressively challenged former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at an Oversight and Government Reform Committee Hearing today. Kucinich confronted Rumsfeld in cross-examination on the Department of Defense’s management of war news and raised questions about the role outside contractors have in shaping the war message.
Kucinich first called into question whether or not there was a Department of Defense press strategy with respect to the war in Iraq.
Kucinich: Was there a Department of Defense press strategy with respect to the war?
Rumsfeld: If there was, it obviously wasn’t very good.
Kucinich: Well you know maybe it was very good, because you actually covered up the Tillman case for a while, you covered up the Jessica Lynch case, you covered up Abu Ghraib, so something was working for you. Was there a strategy to do it Mr. Rumsfeld?
Rumsfeld: Well Congressman, the implication that you said you covered up—that’s just false. You have nothing to base that on. You have not a scrap of evidence or a piece of paper or a witness that would attest to that. I have not been involved in any cover-up whatsoever and I don’t believe there is an individual at this table who I know well and observed at close quarters in very difficult situations who had any role in a cover-up on this matter.
Kucinich: Well thank you for acquitting yourself. I was speaking of the Department of Defense. And I was speaking of things that are manifest and obvious. We held a hearing on the Tillman case. We’ve held hearings on Abu Ghraib. In the hearing on this, you have not been able to establish how is it that this news could get out? No one managed it, no one communicated it to the American public. It just happened? I mean, you haven’t really given this committee a good explanation as to how it happened, Mr. Rumsfeld.
Kucinich then raised the question as to whether or not the Department of Defense used a public relations firm to communicate false information to the general public.
Kucinich: Was the Rendon Group involved in communicating a press strategy on behalf of the Department of Defense with respect to the war in Iraq?
Rumsfeld: You would have ask the people in the department.
Kucinich: You have no knowledge of this whatsoever?
Rumsfeld: I am aware that there have been over the years, contracts with that organization from various entities within the department and outside of the department. Whether there was in a manner that would fit your question, I am not in a position to answer.
Kucinich: You just said you have some awareness of it. Can you elaborate on that, sir?
Rumsfeld: I elaborated to the extent of my ability. I know that there are some entities in the department that have used contractors for some things of that type, over the years. And you would have to ask experts on that subject, not me.
<h3>Kucinich asked that the committee look further into the role played by the Rendon Group and Lincoln Group in shaping news accounts justifying the war in Iraq.</h3>
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Quote:
http://www.prwatch.org/node/6306#comment-2324
Military Propaganda in the US
Submitted by The Walsh Wire on Thu, 08/02/2007 - 16:19.
Two most important elements of a fascist state are an all-controlling wealthy/corporate class working in concert with a permanent political class and a sophisticated public brainwashing mechanism. We now have the former,if we are not careful,we soon have the latter.
<h2>The fact that the military would be so confident as to even consider such a path should be evidence enough to show how far along we have come in throwing away our liberty.......</h2>
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Quote:
http://www.totse.com/en/politics/us_...ry/164081.html
War.com: The Internet and Psychological Operations
by Angela Maria Lungu
Angela Maria Lungu, Major
US Army
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.
......3. PSYOP AND THE LAW
Despite this growing interest, there are still significant legal boundaries constraining PSYOP. Currently, both U. S. policy and law prohibit military forces from conducting PSYOP against American citizens, 14 in addition to restrictions imposed by international law.
This becomes a crucial point since today's public diplomacy messages are increasingly delivered to both domestic and foreign audiences by many of the same media (CNN, the World Wide Web, and international wire services) and can be accessed on the Internet from anywhere, which in turn have a significant impact on PSYOP forces' dissemination means.
Domestic Law
There are several laws that govern public diplomacy which, because many PSYOP products and their dissemination constitute a form of public diplomacy, also govern military PSYOP. The Smith-Mundt Act 16 was introduced in 1948 as an outgrowth of President Wilson's Committee on Public Information 17 and President Truman's "Campaign of Truth" programs. 18 It was passed unanimously by Congress, becoming the basic charter for postwar public diplomacy policy, and established of the U. S. Information Agency (USIA), whose two-fold mission was to "[ project] an accurate image of American society and [explain] to foreign audiences the nature, meaning, and rationale of our foreign policies." 19 The Foreign-Relations Act of 1972 amended the Smith-Mundt Act to include a ban on disseminating within the U. S. any "information about the U. S., its people, and its policies" 20 prepared for dissemination abroad, and the Zorinksy Amendment further restricted public diplomacy by prohibiting any funds to be used "… to influence public opinion in the [U. S.], and no program material … shall be distributed within the [U. S.]." 21 Additionally, the 1998 Foreign Relations Restructuring Act merged several agencies, to include the USIA, under the Department of State (DOS), and authorized the DOS to conduct Foreign Public Diplomacy. 22
The point of contention rests on the difficulty of sending one message to international audiences while sending another to domestic media, particularly when viewed through the legal lens. 23 The charter of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, International Public Information, focused on this point, making clear that international public information (IPI) activities "are overt and address foreign audiences only," while at the same time noting that domestic information should be "deconflicted" and "synchronized" so as not to send a contradictory message. As one administration official said, "In the old days, the [USIA] and State were the main agencies for communicating internationally. With the information revolution, all agencies now have the ability to communicate internationally and interact with foreign populations. IPI is a mechanism that has been established to make sure that these various actors are working in a coordinated manner." 24.....
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Quote:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...072002163.html
The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue
U.S. Needs to Devise a Different 'Brand' to Win Over the Iraqi People, Study Advises
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, July 21, 2007; A01
In the advertising world, brand identity is everything. Volvo means safety. Colgate means clean. IPod means cool. But since the U.S. military invaded Iraq in 2003, its "show of force" brand has proved to have limited appeal to Iraqi consumers, according to a recent study commissioned by the U.S. military.
The key to boosting the image and effectiveness of U.S. military operations around the world involves "shaping" both the product and the marketplace, and then establishing a brand identity that places what you are selling in a positive light, said clinical psychologist Todd C. Helmus, the author of "Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation." The 211-page study, for which the U.S. Joint Forces Command paid the Rand Corp. $400,000, was released this week.
Helmus and his co-authors concluded that the "force" brand, which the United States peddled for the first few years of the occupation, was doomed from the start and lost ground to enemies' competing brands. While not abandoning the more aggressive elements of warfare, the report suggested, a more attractive brand for the Iraqi people might have been "We will help you." That is what President Bush's new Iraq strategy is striving for as it focuses on establishing a protective U.S. troop presence in Baghdad neighborhoods, training Iraq's security forces, and encouraging the central and local governments to take the lead in making things better.
Many of the study's conclusions may seem as obvious as they are hard to implement amid combat operations and terrorist attacks, and Helmus acknowledged that it could be too late for extensive rebranding of the U.S. effort in Iraq. But Duane Schattle, whose urban operations office at the Joint Forces Command ordered the study, said that "cities are the battlegrounds of the future" and what has happened in Baghdad provides lessons for the future. "This isn't just about going in and blowing things up," Schattle said. "This is about working in a very complex environment."
In an urban insurgency, for example, civilians can help identify enemy infiltrators and otherwise assist U.S. forces. They are less likely to help, the study says, when they become "collateral damage" in U.S. attacks, have their doors broken down or are shot at checkpoints because they do not speak English. Cultural connections -- seeking out the local head man when entering a neighborhood, looking someone in the eye when offering a friendly wave -- are key.
The most successful companies, the Rand study notes, are those that study their clientele and shape their workplace and product in ways that incorporate their brand into every interaction with consumers.....
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Quote:
http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache...lnk&cd=1&gl=us
“I Was a Propaganda Intern in Iraq”
By Willem Marx & Amy Goodman, Counter Currents, 22 August 2006
We speak with Willem Marx, a former intern with the Washington-based government contractor, the Lincoln Group. He spent a summer in Baghdad paying to plant pro-American articles secretly written by the U.S. military in the Iraqi press.
He held a loaded submachine gun while being driven through Baghdad by two Kurdish security men. He had three million dollars in cash locked inside his bedroom in the Green Zone.
Armed with a gun, he interrogated Iraqi employees about whether they were doing their job.
He spent a summer in Baghdad paying to plant pro-American articles in the Iraqi press that were secretly written by the US military.
He was just 22 years old and he was an intern at the Lincoln Group, the Washington-based government contractor. The company gained notoriety last November after the Los Angeles Times first revealed it was being paid by the Pentagon to plant stories in the Iraqi press as part of a secret military propaganda campaign. A subsequent Pentagon investigation in March cleared the Lincoln Group of any wrongdoing.
Today, we speak with that former intern of the Lincoln Group. Willem Marx is a freelance writer and a graduate student in journalism at New York University. His article detailing his experience is published in the latest issue of Harpers Magazine. It’s titled “Misinformation Intern: My summer as a military propagandist in Iraq.” He joins us on the line from Uzbekistan.
AMY GOODMAN: Today, we speak with that former intern of the Lincoln Group—his name, Willem Marx. He joins us on the line from Uzbekistan. He’s a freelance writer and a graduate student in journalism at New York University. His piece—his latest piece appears in Harper’s magazine, detailing his experience. It’s called “Misinformation Intern: My Summer as a Military Propagandist in Iraq.” Willem Marx, thank you for joining us.
WILLEM MARX: Hi, Amy. Good to be with you.
AMY GOODMAN: It’s good to have you with us. Well, why don’t you start out just explaining, how did you get this job?
WILLEM MARX: Well, it started when I was approaching my final exams at Oxford just over a year ago, and a cousin of mine who lived in New York told me about a company that was offering internships in Baghdad. I had a place to study at NYU the following September, and I thought that a summer working in Iraq would be a very good experience for me as a burgeoning young reporter. And I sent off my resume. I saw a sort of position offered as a media intern. It didn’t give a huge amount of detail. And it seemed like an opportunity that very few people my age would get. And having sent off my resume, I was contacted by the company, went through a few telephone interviews, and soon found myself flying over to D.C. to pick up a military identification card and then, a few days later, landing in Baghdad.
AMY GOODMAN: When you came to this country, you met the founders of the Lincoln Group?
WILLEM MARX: Yes, I did. Two men—one called Christian Bailey, who is a Brit like me, and another former Marine called Paige Craig, who—they have their headquarters in Washington, D.C.
AMY GOODMAN: And can you tell us any more about them and about that part of—
WILLEM MARX: Absolutely. Absolutely. I arrived in D.C., having not been there for a few years, since I visited a cousin at a university there. I didn’t know the city very well. They put me up in a hotel near their office, and the morning after I had arrived, I walked up there. It was on K Street, the heart of the lobbying industry. And I was introduced to both of them. Paige Craig was very military, not particularly friendly, and just, you know, muttered a few words to me, whereas Christian Bailey had also gone to Oxford, and so we chatted about that for a while.
Neither of them were very forthcoming really about what I would be doing out in Iraq. Pretty sort of sketchy on details. But both, you know, were telling me there were great opportunities for young people like me. They were a company that was growing rapidly. And they welcomed me on board and wished me good luck.
AMY GOODMAN: Willem Marx, we’re going to break, and then we’re going to come back to hear about your time in Iraq, your time in the Green Zone and out. Willem Marx, former intern with the Lincoln Group. Stay with us.
AMY GOODMAN: Our guest is Willem Marx. We’re speaking to him now in Uzbekistan, a freelance writer and graduate student, spent the summer, last summer, in Iraq as an intern with the Lincoln Group and has written a piece about it in the latest edition of Harper’s magazine called “Misinformation Intern: My Summer as a Military Propagandist in Iraq.” Willem Marx, had either man who founded the Lincoln Group been to Iraq?
WILLEM MARX: Yes. Paige Craig, the former Marine, had certainly spent a lot of time there, I think after the initial invasion in March 2003, and from what I understood, he went out there to try and facilitate business opportunities for foreign investors and in a very roundabout way ended up with a contract for, I think, what they call “strategic communications” with the U.S. military.
The other, the Brit, Christian Bailey, had never, when I first met him, been out to Iraq, and he explained to me that every time he meant to go out there, something would come up in D.C., and he was needed to stay behind. Just after I left, at the end of August, I think he made a trip out there for a few days, but as far as I’m aware, that’s the only time he’s been there.
AMY GOODMAN: So you got on a plane and went to Baghdad. Describe your experience there.
WILLEM MARX: Well, I arrived in Baghdad airport and was taken to a villa in the Green Zone via Camp Victory. After about a week of twiddling my thumbs and not really doing a lot, I became rather impatient and emailed people back in D.C., saying, you know, “What am I doing here? I thought I was going to be doing some work.” And within a day or two, I was taken to lunch by another employee, and he explained to me in detail what exactly it was the Lincoln Group was doing. And I was going to take over his position, because he was going on holiday, so—on vacation, I should say.
And what he was doing was receiving English-written articles by soldiers in a certain unit inside Camp Victory, the major U.S. base just south of Baghdad. He was choosing which of those articles would be published in Iraqi newspapers. He was sending them to Iraqi employees, getting them translated into Arabic, getting them okayed by the command back at Camp Victory and then having other Iraqi employees run them down to Iraqi newspapers, where they would pay editors, sub-editors, commissioning editors to run them as news stories in the Iraqi newspapers. And that was the role, you know, after about a week or ten days of me being there, that I took over click to show .
And for the first two or three weeks of that, things seemed to go according to plan. I obviously wasn’t hugely happy about the work I was doing, but I saw it as a very, very interesting insight into how both the U.S. military operate in Iraq and also how contractors operate there. And things started to get slightly more exciting, in that the company was offered a much larger contract to do all sorts of other types of media placement, both on television and radio, and the internet and through posters around Baghdad. And I was involved in setting up some of the budgeting and the execution of this larger contract, which was worth $10 million a month for the company.
AMY GOODMAN: $10 million. According to MSNBC, “In December 2005, Pentagon documents indicate the Lincoln Group […] received a $100 million contract to help produce these favorable articles, translate [them] into Arabic, get them placed in Iraqi newspapers and not reveal the Pentagon’s role.”
WILLEM MARX: I think MSNBC has got it slightly confused. The Lincoln Group was one of three companies also offered—also contracted for up to $100 million for a contract with the Psychological Operations Joint Task Force, I think it’s called, down in Florida. And that $100 million was dependent on pictures they made, ideas they came up with and could then sell to the military. That contract, with Lincoln Group at least, has been canceled, I think as recently as this month. I think I saw a piece in the Washington Post reporting that. So that $100 million, very little of it was ever given to the company, I think, and it was certainly touted by them as one of their major crowning achievements. But these are $20 million over two months, the $10 million a month for media placement in Iraq, was a separate contract with the military in Iraq.
AMY GOODMAN: So, Willem, talk about how you chose these articles. Talk about the generals you communicated with, what the content of the articles were.
WILLEM MARX: Sure. Well, I’d get about five a day from this unit inside Camp Victory. And they’d vary from profiles of an Iraqi policewoman, maybe, to stories about factories opening, hospitals opening, terrorists being eliminated. And I tried as much as possible to stay away from those that dealt with terrorism and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. I thought they were particularly inflammatory, often badly informed about local feelings towards insurgents in Iraq.
And I tried as much as possible to push pieces which talked about reconstruction. I’d pass those ones onto Iraqi employees, that talked about hospitals being rebuilt, and they were very clinical stories. There was not often a lot of art to the writing, but I felt that those were definitely stories that, you know, the mainstream media, both in Iraq and elsewhere, would not be writing about, purely because they would have no access to them. And it was the kind of positive spin on the situation that I felt more comfortable with using.
AMY GOODMAN: And then—
WILLEM MARX: And I’d—sorry, yes?
AMY GOODMAN: Talk about then what you would do once you chose these articles? Who would you transmit them to?
WILLEM MARX: I would send them to an Iraqi in Lincoln Group’s downtown Iraqi office, which was staffed entirely by local Iraqis, and he would choose one of the translators they had there, get it turned into Arabic, send back to me. I unfortunately don’t read Arabic at all well. And I would then send it to the command. I think they had an Iraqi translator there themselves, who would check that it more or less followed the original English. They would rubber stamp it, and I would then send it back to the Iraqi office saying, “This is good to go. Put it in newspaper A, B, or C.”
And from there, the process really was beyond my control, and they would do their best to place it in the newspaper I’d ask them to put it in, and often they didn’t, and I began to grow suspicious about why exactly they weren’t putting it in certain newspapers. And that led to what was, to me, the most shocking episode of my time in Iraq, when I was called upon to question some of the Iraqi employees at the downtown office as to why articles were being placed in newspapers we hadn’t asked them to be put in and also why they were charging these newspapers far more than they had when I’d first arrived, the suspicion being that Iraqi employees were taking a cut of the money they then expensed the company.
AMY GOODMAN: Why don’t you explain that whole journey, how you left the Green Zone and went to conduct this interrogation?
WILLEM MARX: It was extraordinary. I was asked by my boss at the company to look into—you know, I’d noticed these discrepancies myself in the kind of flow charts we kept, which monitored how many articles were published and where, and I saw there were some very strange goings on in these records, and I was sent to go and investigate, myself. So I took a friend from the Green Zone, an Iraqi guy who lived nearby and worked more or less as a handyman for another American contractor. He agreed to come down as a mutual sort of friend of mine and translator, who the other Iraqi employees wouldn’t know and would not be able to follow or suspect, in case there was any foul play to be experienced.
And he and I drove down to this downtown office through all the checkpoints, sort of mid-afternoon, I would say, arrived at this office, which, of course, is bolted and relatively heavily guarded inside this apartment building. And I went straight to the head of the Iraqi office and said, “I want to speak to such-and-such and such-and-such and ask them about these discrepancies.” And I, at this stage, had no idea who was really involved, who was guilty and, because my Arabic was very rudimentary, I very rarely understood much of what was sort of said in front of me, so it was difficult to know who I should be trusting. And I sat down with one employee after another and really questioned them about their involvement in the publishing of these stories and whether they had been taking kickbacks in connivance with local editors.
And the really startling episode I write about is sitting down with one of these men, who I’d never really trusted, and he very angrily was protesting the accusations I was laying against him. And I carried a gun very often with me when I traveled outside of the Green Zone, a small sort of Glock revolver, and carried it in my belt, and as I sat down to talk to this man, after a few moments, I realized that the revolver was very uncomfortably placed inside my belt. And as I started asking these very accusatory questions, I pulled the gun out of my belt and put it on the table between the two of us and suddenly realized that was a horrifically threatening motion. And I was really quite disgusted with myself, and the man left. He ran away out of the office when I was questioning someone else.
The two men who had been sent to help me put pressure, along with my own translator friend, to help me put pressure on these employees were former Mukhabarat officers, part of Saddam’s intelligence service, and they told me the best approach would be to sort of threaten this guy with a CIA investigation, telling me that those three letters were the most threatening three letters to any Iraqi. And once I had learned that the man I’d probably gone on, as it were, had left the building, I decided, you know, it was getting dark, and I needed to get the hell out of there, and this was not at all the sort of thing I should be spending my time doing if I wanted to be a journalist. And that really precipitated my departure from Baghdad. I decided, you know, that week, I was out of there.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the amounts of money that we’re talking about on both ends? Here you were interrogating these Iraqis about whether they had possibly pocketed some of the money that was supposed to go to the newspapers. And yet, on the other hand, you had the Lincoln Group receiving millions of dollars.
WILLEM MARX: Absolutely.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you explain?
WILLEM MARX: Well, that was one of the really shocking things to me, is that, you know, I was sent down to talk to these guys, and at most we paid, I think, roughly $2,000 to place an article in the best Iraqi newspapers. And, you know, they were taking half of that. They were pocketing a grand an article, which in Iraq, as I’m sure you’d appreciate, is a huge amount of money and would have helped them and their families quite significantly.
At the same time, items in the contract that the Lincoln Group had with the U.S. military—one such item, a line item, as they would call it, would be placing a TV commercial on Iraqi television, and that would require them to film, edit and then air these 30-second-long or minute-long on-air sort of commercials. And each commercial, they were paid $1 million, just over $1 million. And when I went to try and, you know, get some idea of prices for these things, I was told that you could effectively get one of these on air for about $12,000, and as I’m sure you appreciate, that’s a pretty significant profit margin. And yet, there was I, interrogating people with guns for a mere $1,000.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the U.S. generals involved and also the Iraqi newspapers you had these articles placed in?
WILLEM MARX: Yes. The process by which I passed on these articles often involved a bit of back-and-forth between myself and captains and majors in the U.S. military unit that I dealt with, and my relationship with them was very important to the company. I had to at times be diplomatic, at times be critical. And occasionally I would have to give up my editorial control over which articles were pushed through to the Iraqi media, because they had, themselves, received orders from above, from men like General Casey, who was the top commander in Iraq at the time and, I believe, still is. And General Casey said, “No, sorry. It’s very important we publish this article. You guys make sure the Lincoln Group publishes it.” And lo and behold, we’d publish it, even though it would be something that I felt was, you know, not really suitable and would grate with many Iraqis reading it, who would think this is obviously American propaganda.
And, you know, the newspapers we dealt with, I think on occasions like that, were very, very suspicious, I would imagine, of who was planting these articles, where they were coming from, why freelance Iraqi writers would turn up to their offices and offer them $1,000, $2,000 to publish an article. And there must have been a huge suspicion from some of these editors that the Americans were involved.
And one particular article about the Badr Brigade, which is a Shiite militia, I’m sure you know, which General Casey was very keen to push, basically applauded the Badr Brigade for not retaliating against attacks on the Shia in Baghdad. And he was very keen to get it pushed out, and two newspapers in a row refused to publish it, because it was too inflammatory in a political sense. So that was a very interesting experience, having this senior, senior general getting involved in the nitty-gritty and wanting one particular story to go out, only to discover that no Iraqi newspapers in their right mind were willing to publish it for however much money we offered.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, Willem Marx, I want to thank you very much for joining us. Have a safe trip back to the United States. I look forward to meeting you when you come back to New York to get your journalism education. Willem Marx has written a piece in the latest edition of Harper’s magazine called “Misinformation Intern: My Summer as a Military Propagandist in Iraq.”
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2006/09/0081195
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