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Question about God
Here is a famous question posed by Plato:
Are things morally just because God willed it? OR Did God will it because they're morally just? |
It has been a long time since I've taken any classes, but doesn't it go something like:
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At least that's how I remember it. Was it from The Republic? Like I said, it has been quite some time since I've read it. |
Well, my answer to this is almost certainly the most controversial, and likely the most complex. Because an internet forum lends itself to oversimplification, let me just note that my position is largely the same as that of John Duns Scotus, so if it seems interesting to you, but overly simple, I assure you that its oversimplification is because of the medium (not to mention my own inadequacies next to the Subtle Doctor), not because the view itself is overly simple.
The view is this: God, being free, did not have to create. But given that he chose to create, he had to create beings that had their end (telos, not eschaton) in him. So, while he was free to choose whatever system of morality he liked, he had to choose a system whose goal was union with him. To put it another way, any system of morality that met these conditions was going to be one that revealed God's own attributes. But He had the choice as to which attributes of his he chose to reveal. So while the system of morality was up to God, he had to will a just system as opposed to an unjust system. To put it another way, there's both an ontological claim and an epistemological claim here. The ontological claim is that some commands of morality could have been otherwise. There's a pretty clear analogy here; within the system of particular morality, we have traffic laws which are binding, but obviously could have been otherwise without being unjust (speed limits, what side of the road we drive on, etc.) The epistemological claim is that we don't know that morality couldn't have been different. But note that none of this should be taken to mean that we can in fact act in a way otherwise than what was in fact commanded. That's why He's God. |
God may have freely chose to create, but his act of creation was not free. Some power for it to be that he "had to create beings that had their own telos in him." (Plus, if you want to talk about telos, then you allow for Hume's argument that "can doesn't imply ought").
In other words, he is forced to create beings in a "just system," which implies that there is a higher morality than God. Or if he creates the system then all morality is arbitrary. There has been one argument that, in a sense, works: God is both the system and commander. Having just written this, it seems to me that perhaps that is what John Scotus is arguing and what you wrote; I confess I'm not entirely positive as I know nothing about Scotus and his apologetics. |
I don't believe in God.
Or morals. So I'm going to have to completely object to this question. |
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Plus if you don't believe in morals, why do you pay your bills to use the internet/wear clothes/etc etc. |
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I disagree with some of what you say in your first post, but I think some of that is just our ways of putting things, so I won't linger on that. But you talk about Hume's argument that you can't derive an ought from an is, and that's as good a place as any. Simply put, I think Hume was both right and wrong. You can't derive the right from what is, just because what is doesn't entail anything specific about what is good for us. But he's wrong in that you can say that what is good is grounded in what is. Let me put this another way. Essentially the position boils down to "good is good because God says so". But this seems entirely arbitrary, and we like to think that to some extent good is good just because. So Scotus wants to ground morality in human nature, while still also grounding it in God. That is to say, Scotus's system has the advantage that Thomas's system has of making the good something grounded in what is (and so not based on God's mere whim like later divine command theories), while also having the advantage of grounding morality in God's will. |
I don't believe in God or morals either (because as concepts, they throw out obviously erroneous consequences such as the need to ask this question), but I pay my bills because if I don't they will cut off my electricity. It's nothing more than common sense.
A system has rules, whether they are the laws of physics, a set of mathematical axioms, or the social etiquette conducted whilst having tea with the Queen. The rules are what make a system work, they define it, and the interactions that occur within it. One thing that the rules have to do is not contradict one another. When rules contradict, we have a paradox. To solve the paradox, we have to either find a new rule, or reappraise our understanding of the rules. A paradox is the point at which a system fails to operate, the point at which it shrugs and starts hinting at infinities, or asks us mysteriously how many angels might dance on the head of a pin. If a system has too many of these paradoxes, it can be deemed to be false. Or rather, the premises on which the system is based can be deemed to be false. The problem with this question as posed is that it helps prove the non existence of God. It creates a paradox. Did God create Morality, or is Morality something higher than God? Is Morality one of Plato's 'Forms'? I'd argue for none of the above. Instead, morality (small m) can be best described as a set of behaviours and attitudes that allows a person to function within a society with the optimum ratio of success to effort, and individual vs societical gains. It is a construct of inter-personal interactions that simply did not exist before we did. Poof. The contradictions disappear. |
If God said that torturing small children for the fun of it was morally acceptable, he would clearly be wrong. I can't really offer any arguments as to why this is true, but it certainly seems to be from my perspective.
Two further points: The discussion of morality and God occurs in Plato's dialogue Meno. The question is actually about "the pious", but Socrates uses this word to mean "loved by the gods", so this discussion is in the Platonic spirit. Morality most certainly is one of Plato's Forms: it is called "the Good". |
I don't accept either as a premise.
IMO, morality is a part of what God is. In otherwords, God's actions are inherently moral, being in the best intentions for His creation. That is not to say that God could not choose to do something not in the best interest of His creation, but that He won't. |
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Neither. If there is a god - he/she is not giving us clear instructions or generally being helpful on a day-to-day and year-to-year basis.
We've got to decide for ourselves. In a nutshell, for me a moral decisions is one that is consistent with living in a community in which people help each other, or failing that - are able to trust each other and work together without external safegaurds/enforcement. Some people choose to play the game of life by another set of rules. |
If morals are universal and determined by God, it's odd that he set different moral standards for different religions and different parts of the world.
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If you are a Christian, Jesus' instructions were actually pretty clear. |
I'm going with the position, if you accept the confinement of talking in terms of personified dieties, that it is a false contradiction. I do not see that the positions are necessarily mutually exclusive. I think it's an academically interesting thought experiment, but I fail to find that the points are actually divergent or distinct.
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