Ontological Argument
 

Does anyone subscribe to this philosophical idea as proof that a god must exist?

Ontological Argument:
It is self contradictory to deny that there exists a greatest possible being ie. god

Well, the more complete argument would be something like the following:

1. God is, by definition, the greatest possible being.
2. As the greatest possible being, he has all perfections. (That is, all properties which it is better to have than not to have -- power, goodness, etc.)
3. It is better to exist than not to exist.
4. Therefore, God has the property of existence, and has it necessarily.
5. Objection -- Actually, all that proves is that if God exists, he exists necessarily.
6. God possibly exists. Let's cash this out as "There is a possible world in which God exists."
7. But then God exists necessarily in that possible world.
8. So God exists in all possible worlds.
9. The actual world is a possible world.
10. Therefore, God exists in the actual world.

I'm not sure if it works or not. The most common objection (after "Hey! That can't possibly work! -- which isn't actually a valid objection :)) is that existence isn't a property, which I don't think I buy. Another possible objection is to dispute the use made of possible worlds, but that's outside of my competency.

(NB: This version of the argument can be found, in a better form, in Alvin Plantinga's book "God, Freedom, and Evil".)

6. God possibly exists. Let's cash this out as "There is a possible world in which God exists."
7. But then God exists necessarily in that possible world.
8. So God exists in all possible worlds.

8 is wrong. god only exists in the possible worlds in which he he does exist, because, if he doesn't exist, it is not necessary that he exist

Firefly, that's not quite right. If something exists necessarily, it exists in all possible worlds. That's just what it means to exist necessarily. (If you buy possible world semantics, which most (analytic) philosophers do).

but according to those arguments god only exists necessarily under the assumption that he exists and he is perfect, and those are not reasonable assumptions

I think the largest objection, if I may call it that, to the argument comes, as asaris pointed out, do we accept existence as a perfection/property?

Since no one else has picked at it, number three bothers me. Why, pray tell, is it better to exist than not to exist?

The human mind has some rather biased opinions on this. Just because we exist doesn't mean that its better than not existing. This is the same faulty logic that assumes god is sentient and has an ego and consciousness. Its just divine anthropomorphism. The Greek pantheon applied to a monotheistic idea.

Simply cause existence presupposes all else, remove existence from any doctrine and you are left with nothing. Without existence, the ideas of better and worse have no meaning.

Wow! Talk about a circular argument: To sum up those ten points: If God exists, he exists.

Philosophical arguments for God are good, but they don't replace proof (to which I do not believe there is any). I think it's all a matter of faith.

I always smile when I think of the babel fish though....


:D

I agree, scientific proof would be rather difficult, far as I can tell, it would require the ability to sense something other than energy that can do things. In other words, something outside of the laws that control this universe. The Babel fish proof is damned good though, too bad this planet doesn't have one...

Since those are beyond us right now, looks like it's philosophical proof, and the only way to do that is have everyone agree on the precedents, not an easy thing to do.

This argument has been refuted hundreds of years ago. Bringing it up in a philosophical discussion nowadays is like drawing a sword against a tank. It is a circular argument, and therefore worthless.

It's a notoriously difficult argument to refute -- as nietzsche pointed out, the most used 'refutation' is Kant's -- that existence is not a property. But it keeps coming up. The Plantinga book I cited was written in the 1970s. The problem with claiming existence is not a property is it's then hard to say exactly what it is.

It's certainly not circular, or, at least, not obviously so. "God exists" nowhere shows up as a premise, so if you're going to claim it's circular, you have a bit more work to do.

Firefly wrote:
No, the assumption is that he exists in some possible world. That's not the same thing as assuming he exists. The other 'assumption' you accuse the argument of (that he's perfect) is closer -- what it claims is that if God exists, he is perfect. It can assume that, because that's just what we mean by the word 'God'. If there was a really, really powerful being floating around somewhere, who did most of the things traditionally attributed to God, he still wouldn't be God, since he wasn't perfect. God means, by definition, the perfect being.

it's ridiculous how obviously circular that argument is. i really can't believe you can't see it.

7. But then God exists necessarily in that possible world.
8. So God exists in all possible worlds.

how can you make that leap from 7 to 8? god only exists in the possible worlds in which he exists, and those are also the only possible worlds in which it is NECESSARY that he exists. watch what happens if i change number 6 and do the same crap you did..

6. God possibly does not exist. Let's cash this out as "There is a possible world in which God does not exist."
7. But then God does not exist in that possible world.
8. So God does not exist in any possible world.
9. The actual world is a possible world.
10. Therefore, God does not exist in the actual world.

Hmmm. I have problems with:

3. It is better to exist than not to exist

I guess existence can be a property; after all we talk of fictional characters all the time:

Holmes is a detective.
Holmes does not exist (? add "in the real world")

I think the arguments about "surely God could exist in some possible worlds and not others" are answered by the fact that the "proof" is a priori and hence if it works in one possible world, it works in all - ie necessary.

However, I prefer to stick with the Douglas Adams approach:

"I refuse to prove that I exist," says God, "for proof denies faith, and without faith I am nothing."
"But," says Man, "the Babel fish is a dead giveaway isn't it? It proves you exist, and so therefore, you don't. Q.E.D.."

what's the point of having multiple possible worlds if they're all exactly the same?

If God was perfect, he wouldn't have made humans because his perfection means that he has no desires because he is already perfect. Therefore, God doesn't exist.

They're not all the same -- in fact, if two possible worlds are the same, they're the same possible world. But if a fact is necessarily (like, relatively uncontroversially, 2 + 2 = 4), it's true in all possible worlds. So, for example, there's a subset of possible worlds in which I exist. There are some possible worlds where I don't exist. But in all possible worlds, the statement "For all x, if x is a man, x is mortal" is true. Similarly, the Ontological Argument attempts to prove that the statement "God exists" is necessarily true.

My roommate suggested that I should point out that the original intention of the Ontological Argument (found in the Monologion by St. Anselm) was not to prove the existence of God, but to explore what he's like.

EXACTLY, they aren't all the same. it is only necessary that he exist in the possible worlds in which you have already established that he exist. IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT HE EXIST IN THE OTHER POSSIBLE WORLDS.

They're only exactly the same for theorems you can prove a priori - ie those which are necessarily true.
ie in all possible worlds, 2+2=4 (assuming we are taking all to be 'all logically possible'). You can prove that without any reference to the world itself - it is 'a priori' and therefore necessarily true; true in all the worlds.
A fact like "grass is green" cannot be proven by simply using the axioms of the system - you must refer to the possible world itself; ie "grass is green" is true iff grass is green. It is only true in a limited subset of possible worlds.
So "necessary" statements are true in all possible worlds, whereas "possible" ones are only true in some - so they're not all the same.

The bit I like about the ontological argument is its ability to prove almost anything:

eg define a Unicorn as "the most perfect horse", and start at step 3. Hence unicorns exist, and do so necessarily!

so.. in your words, the ontological argument says "god exists iff god exists"

wow! How did such a riduculous line of reasoning ever manage to get such a fancy name?

I can't really add anything since I'm not a philosophy buff, but I can note that this is one of the more interesting theological debates I've read on here to date. Thanks, guys! :thumbsup:

Anyway, I'd say that as a philosophical argument, it fails to regard the naturalist fallacy (I hope this is the universal name for it), in that it relies on theory (i.e. God is perfect because that is most desirable -- which it may very well not be), to base an argument. In essence, it's using a theory that can't discriminately be disproved to prove another point.

This is a terribly constructed thought, so I will simplify.

"Man cannot see Planet X without optical aids."

You can't disprove that, so it must be correct. In essence, this is exactly what I see the Ontological Argument doing in terms of Divine Existence.

Blah. I hope after a 9-hour workday this makes a shred of sense.

Firefly--

You don't understand the argument. Steps 4 and 5 are what you take to be the conclusion of the argument. The rest of the argument deals with your objection.

Cliche--
That objection doesn't really work. The 'most perfect horse' would have to have all perfections. Since these perfections include omnipotence and omniscience, the 'most perfect horse' would actually be God. Or, assuming you mean rather a horse that exemplies 'horseness' perfectly, it would not exist, since having all perfections is not required by our concept of horse.

CSflim--
Well, because people keep trying to refute or resurrect it. In addition to Anselm, famous philosophers who have made use of some version of it include John Duns Scotus, Descartes, and Plantinga. Famous philosophers who have tried to refute it include Gaunilo and Kant. But, while it certainly looks ridiculous on the face of it, it's notoriously hard to refute.

There's an apocryphal anecdote about the atheist philosopher Betrand Russell. One day, as he was going for a walk, thinking about how to refute the Ontological Argument, he exclaimed, "It works!" and dropped his pipe. Apparently later he figured that that conclusion was a mere mental aberration.

well, god being perfect isn't theory, it's definition. with that in mind, i have no problem with that part of the argument

asaris, I don't understand the jump from 7 to 8. It seems to me to say "If something could exist, it does exist. Perhaps you could try to elaborate on how to go from

7. But then God exists necessarily in that possible world.

to

8. So God exists in all possible worlds.

1. SOME MEN have BLACK hair.
2. JOHN is a MAN
THEREFORE:
3. JOHN has BLACK hair.
:confused:

Time to nitpick, but why would the "most perfect horse" have omniscience and omniptence? What does a horse need with said characteristics? To me, and Plato, the most perfect version of some concept is the idealized version. In essence, an omniscience and omnipotent horse would be an imperfect horse simply because it outsteps what a horse should be capable of.

There is another argument as to the redundancy of saying omniscient and the following it with omnipotent. By default, if one knows everything, then one is going to be able to accomplish anything. In other words, if you wish to commit some act and are omniscient, you will, by default, know how to perform said act given your circumstances. Thus adding omnipotent to omniscient is a tad redundant.

i think it's possible to be omniscient without being omnipotent, but not to be omnipotent without being omniscient

CSFlim the jump is because you've made the proof from axioms only: ie the proof is valid in all possible worlds because it does not refer to facts about the world itself. Therefore, if it holds in one (which personally, I reckon it does not) it would hold in all - ie necessary.

asaris I like your objection to my horse. Perhaps I need to define something like: A unicorn (OK, probably not really a unicorn any more) is the most foo horse, where foo is a property denoting having-horn-ness and existence ;)

(seriously)
We're basically saying it works for any property where 'existence' increases that property in some way. So we can define ourselves any number of arbitrary properties which include existence in some way, and prove that something exists with that property... ?

moonduck - a brain-in-a-vat (I love philosophy!) could be omniscient without having the power to actually do anything about it, surely?

maybe because of people like you who just don't seem to listen to what CSFlim and i are saying..

actually, after a short google search, it's because what you wrote isn't the ontological argument... and what you wrote is obviously wrong

here's the real one (at least according to http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/o/ont-arg.htm ):

1. It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (i.e., the greatest possible being that can be imagined).

2. God exists as an idea in the mind.

3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.

4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (i.e., a greatest possible being that does exist).

5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)

6. Therefore, God exists.

Well, now that appears to be an argument! at leats it sort of makes sense on some level! Not that I agree with it mind, but at least it puts forward something which has the appearance of being logically sound.

More later...

well, the fallacy i see in that argument is that it works on the assumption that the a being than which none greater can be imagined exists

What we are proposing is first of all a concept of god. We shall refer to this as Conceptual God...as opposed to Real God.
This Conceptual God "exists" within our minds. The word "exists" is used in the argument to take on far too literal a meaning. For to me a conceptual existence and an actual (?) existence are qualitatively different things.
To elaborate, this conceptual existence seems to imply a reality completely encapsulated by our (collective?) thoughts. It is reminiscent of the "Platonic Reality" of mathematical abstractions (does a perfect circle really exist somewhere?). We are "placing" Conceptual God into a "place", namely the Conceptual reality.
However, we are not in any way confining this Conceptual God in any way by placing it into the Conceptual Reality. This is where the argument hinges on. By placing the Conceptual God into this conceptual reality, we are confining its "powers". as such a Conceptual God cannot allow itself to be constrained by its Conceptual reality, and must "break out" into the real reality, and become the Real God (or simply cease to exist!)
However, there is no confinement in the Conceptual reality, as it doesn't literally "exist", in a similar way that mathematical abstractions do not literally. This conceptual reality is an abstraction of our real reality. In effect we can "place" anything from Real Reality into this Conceptual Reality. So Conceptual God can indeed be perfect and omnipotent and omnipresent within the framework of our defined reality. But we must always remember that this reality does not literally exist!
As such, we may "project" our Conceptual Reality onto The Real Reality, but it will always remain the Conceptual Reality. Similarly, though we may project our Conceptual God onto a Real God, it does not validate the existence of Real God, as the projection remains within the conceptual reality! :crazy:

eeerrrkkk...I was right about it being difficult to put into words! But that is what you get when you come up against tightly formed arguments composed of anti-logic. Maybe I’ll try again later!

"moonduck - a brain-in-a-vat (I love philosophy!) could be omniscient without having the power to actually do anything about it, surely?"

Not really. Let's say our Brain-in-a-vat wanted a cold one. Sans hands, our BIAV could surely not get one for itself. If said BIAV was omniscient, then it would surely know some technique to, say, use untapped potential in the human brain of telekinesis. Thus knowing how to do telekinesis, the BIAV could simply use the power of its' mind to obtain the necessary cold one and, well, pour it into the top of the Vat.

If you know everything, you are everything.

umm.. not if that untapped potential for telekinesis doesn't exist... but i guess once the BIAV stepped in, this argument became less than serious

Pretty much my point, glad you caught it. Still, I would say that once omniscience and omnipotence were brought up, the argument became less than serious. When such absolutes are introduced into arguments, one begins to turn down the path of irrelevance.

moonduck- as firefly mentions, you're kind of assuming the human mind is capable of telekinesis.

And surely pouring a cold one right on top of some poor BIAV is going to cause all sorts of hassle for the evil demons ;)

Firefly--

yes, the argument you mentioned is one version of the Ontological Argument. As you might also notice, that version can only prove "if God exists, he exists". The version I gave is a different version.

CSflim

Because in the commonly accepted semantics for explaining what 'possibly' and 'necessary' mean, 'possibly' means 'true in at least one possible world', and 'necessary' means 'true in all possible worlds'.

Moonduck

Read that post closer. The omniscient horse was only the first part of my counter-objection. The second part dealt with a horse exemplifying horse-ness.

The problem with defining things into existence other than God more generally is that most concepts do not entail existence. The argument seeks to show that the concept 'God' does entail existence. Not that it includes existence, because then the argument would be circular.

"you're kind of assuming the human mind is capable of telekinesis."

Absolutely. However, if firefly can posit a Brain-in-a-Vat, I can certainly posit telekinesis. Still, omniscience is knowing everything, all knowledge. If one can accept the idea of omniscience, would it not therefore be less of a stretch to accept telekinesis?

"Read that post closer. The omniscient horse was only the first part of my counter-objection. The second part dealt with a horse exemplifying horse-ness."

As I said, I was nit-picing. I felt that the "most perfect horse" example was flawed, especially when it was extended by the idea that the "most perfect horse" would possess all perfections. I was perfectly aware of the "horseness" portion of the argument, just felt that the extension of the logic was not quite right. Again, I said I was being nit-picky.

No problems accepting telekinesis, but you're demanding that omniscience always leads to telekinesis so your BIAV can always assure itself of a beer supply. Omniscience and omnipotence are two different things. Whilst anything omnipotent could know anything (after all, it can do anything so no problems gaining any old knowledge) I don't see why it would work the other way round. You can know things without being able to do them!

Commonly accepted sematics does not make reality.

Defining somehting does not make it exist in any real world. We can "say" that it exists as a concept...but that is only a sematic argument, and hence pointless.
If somehting exists only as a concept it does not actually exist...ANYWHERE. In any reality.

Furthermore...something that exists "necessarily", exists necessarily WITHIN THAT PARTICULAR world.

This "ontological argument" is one of the silliest things I have ever argued against in my life. Granted it is very difficult, but that is due to purposeful and malicious misuse of language, and blatant anti-logic.

CSFlim - if something is necessarily true, it is true across the entire range of possible worlds which accept the axioms you're currently dealing with. I know the argument under discussion is full of holes, but the one you're aiming at isn't such a hole as it looks. Because the argument (wrongly) deduces the existence of God from no axioms other than those that we assume are present in all possible worlds, it therefore would hold in all those worlds.

Totally with you there on the "it is silly", but it's definitely the case that if something is necessarily true then it is true in all possible worlds. That's the definition of 'necessarily' as people have been using it previously.

"No problems accepting telekinesis, but you're demanding that omniscience always leads to telekinesis so your BIAV can always assure itself of a beer supply. "

Really? I said that omniscience always leads to telekinesis? I could've sworn that I didn't when I rerad my post a second or two ago. =)

I will reiterate this once more. It is a ludicrous argument. It is ludicrous because it contains such elements as omniscience, omnipotence, and a brain-in-a-vat what desires a brewski. It is, however, wonderful exercise to mentally work on these things, so why not?

Let's say that you are omniscient. You, by definition, know everything. Everything is a lot. A whole lot (Having written that, I feel like Dave Barry). Let's aslo assume, since you dislike the idea, that knowing everything about the human mind doesn't automatically allow you to untap portions of unused potential relating to telekinesis and telepathy. No sweat, right?

Knowing everything presumes that you know things far beyond the ken of mortal, modern man. Now, let's look at the odds. The universe is a damned big place. Really big (there's that Dave Barry feeling again). Mathematically, do you think we're the only planet with advanced life on it? Positing an infinite universe is standard fare these days, and, mathematically, one should find it easy to accept not only other advanced life, but life with culture, science, etc far in advance of ours. Returning to you and your omniscience, you know all about this advanced life and every other advanced lifeform, and everything about its' society and culture. An infinite universe is pretty much guaranteed to have a society what has taught itself the mighty powers of the mind. You now have that knowledge. You teach yourself TK and never have to get up to grab a PBR again.

You are on the right track in saying that omnipotence may lead to omniscience, but I'm not sure how you can accept one without it leading to the other. Omniscience is an absolute, thus it is a pretty big concept. You say that you can know things and not be able to do them. I say that if you know everything, you will know some way to do whatever it is you want to do.

Personally, I find both to be boring. What fun is it to know everything or to be able to do everything? Takes the challenge out of life.

Still, you might want to reread my post. I don't see it as demanding anything. More of having a sort of light bantering tone...

moonduck - OK, not demanding ;) and I see your point about everything getting silly - but I think that's philosophy for you!

The only bit I have a problem with is the "An infinite universe is pretty much guaranteed to have a society what has taught itself the mighty powers of the mind. You now have that knowledge. You teach yourself TK and never have to get up to grab a PBR again." - I don't like the assumption that just because you know how other people are able to do amazing stuff means that you should be able to yourself.

I mean, I'm quite aware of the processes by which a woman goes through the delightful process of giving birth - but I don't think (even if I knew a lot more) I could actually do so! I could modify myself, you say - but you've added in an extra stipulation. It's not simply the knowledge which would allow me to do something like that, but knowledge plus something else. And that's where I have a problem with your BIAV. Personally, I reckon it's going to remain bored and sober :)

FINE! If THAT is what your definition for necessarily is then no.7 seven CANNOT possibly be true. Much less does it logically follow from the previous facts.

7. But then God exists necessarily in that possible world.

Nope...God simply "exists" in that possible world.

And as I already stated, he does not even literraly "exist" in that world at all....becasue that is a hypothetical conceptual world...which doesn't exist!

You cannot keep redefinign words as it suits you so as to aid your argument.

"OK, not demanding and I see your point about everything getting silly - but I think that's philosophy for you!"

Absolutely! And I personally feel that engaging in Sophistry such as this is good practice for the real thing.

"I don't like the assumption that just because you know how other people are able to do amazing stuff means that you should be able to yourself."

Well, if you know how to do it, you should be able to do it. If you cannot do it, you, by definition, know some way to get to the point where you are capable of doing it.

"I mean, I'm quite aware of the processes by which a woman goes through the delightful process of giving birth - but I don't think (even if I knew a lot more) I could actually do so! I could modify myself, you say - but you've added in an extra stipulation."

How is it an extra stipulation? I gave no such limitations as saying that pure knowledge alone would allow you to do whatever you want. By design, perfect knowledge, in this particular iteration of the argument, does not equate to action, it merely equates to the potential for taking the correct action. An extra step is necessary in any action, and that is the act in itself.

"It's not simply the knowledge which would allow me to do something like that, but knowledge plus something else. And that's where I have a problem with your BIAV. Personally, I reckon it's going to remain bored and sober "

Why? If it knows how to get what it wants, why does it not simply take the steps necessary? Frankly, if you are omniscient, it is not so much a stretch to simply posit that you know what actions to take to attain the level of omnipotence (instant gratification omnipotence) that you are thinking of.

Lastly, of course it won't remain sober. It's a Brain-in-a-Vat, it has lackeys!

CSFlim - the point about step 7 is that if (and I appreciate this is a big if, and a load of rubbish etc) you accept all the way to step 6 - which has been generated a priori, then you have to accept step 7; that it's true in all possible worlds. I am completely in agreement with you that the earlier steps are a a load of rubbish, but the step from 6 to 7 isn't. If you can prove something a priori then it holds in all possible worlds, as the proof does not depend on the world - only the axioms of the logical system you're using. Hence 'necessary'. We haven't redefined the word during the course of the argument; it has exactly the same meaning throughout - and a very specific one which it takes on when being used in modal logic.

ie, the fact that steps 1 to 6 are a load of arse doesn't affect step 7. If the earlier ones are true, it must be. If you still don't understand, try googling "Kripke" "modal logic" or "S5 semantics". S5 is one of the stronger modal systems (greatest number of equivalence relations between possible worlds) - if I have time I may copy out part of one of my essays. Does anyone know how to get the symbols for possibly (diamond) and necessarily (square) in TFP?

Moonduck - I think this is our sticking point:
You're making the assumption (I won't argue if it's right or wrong, merely that it is an assumption) that there is some way to get to the point of being capable of doing it. If we get totally ridiculous about this (and I know you love getting silly really ;) ) then imagine an omniscient piece of dust - it might know all, but it may also know that there is no way for it to pour itself a beer. Something being impossible doesn't affect the omniscience; the omniscient dust/BIAV/God is allowed to know that it is impossible. Only if it is also omnipotent do we allow it to do it. So again, I really don't agree with you that omniscience always leads to omnipotence.

From Tilted Nonsense, but thought it might lighten the tone for those who haven't seen it yet!

Proofs of God's existence

I like 26.

Thank you cliche. Your link explains what I think of the ontological view point in a far clearer way than I ever could!

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
(1) I can conceive of a perfect God.
(2) One of the qualities of perfection is existence.
(3) Therefore, God exists.

Does anyone here actually believe that the "Ontological Proof" actually holds any weight? Are are we just debating for the hell of it?

Anyway, I shall use the same line of logic that is used in the ontological proof to prove the non-existence of God.

The "Ontological" Proof of the non-existence of God.

Let X be the perfect proof that God does not exist.
1. X is, by definition, the greatest possible proof on the subject of the existence or not of God.
2. As the greatest proof, it has all perfections. (That is, all properties which it is better to have than not to have -- logic, completeness, etc.)
3. It is better to exist than not to exist.
4. Therefore, X has the property of existence, and has it necessarily.
5. Objection -- Actually, all that proves is that if X exists, it exists necessarily.
6. X possibly exists. Let's cash this out as "There is a possible world in which X exists."
7. But then X exists necessarily in that possible world.
8. So X exists in all possible worlds.
9. The actual world is a possible world.
10. Therefore, X exists in the actual world.
11. X is a proof of the non-existence of God
12. Therefore God doesn't exist.

CSflim, your "The "Ontological" Proof of the non-existence of God."
argument as well as cliche's unicorn idea lack one major point. "x" and "unicorns" have no intrinsic maximums (as explained on the same site you quoted earlier). There is nothing to gauge the greatness of X.

"So again, I really don't agree with you that omniscience always leads to omnipotence."

*shrug* I think it does, and I agree that we are at a sticking point. With sufficient knowlegde and work, anything is possible.

CSflim - I hope you don't intend to take that proof to its logical conclusion and prove all of us out of existence ;) Careful, it's a powerful tool (or hideously flawed as I think all of us have decided during our discussions over the last few days)

nietzsche - so we just have to define our concept with a few intrinsic maxima. Though your point does throw up an interesting possible objection to the ontological argument - that unless all the properties we use to judge God's "perfection" have intrinsic maxima, the whole thing falls flat...

Again I am mostly paraphrasing this response from the following website: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/o/ont-arg.htm

The ontological argument is specific to the case of our so called "being which no greater can be conceived". Read into Gaunilo's Criticism in which he tries to use the o. argument to prove that since we can imagine a greatest possible island it must therefore exist. The problem lies here: with what do we gauge the greatness of this island? Its abundance of fruit? There is no intrinsic maximum to which we can associate with fruit abundance--we can always imagine a greater abundance. In the case of a so called god we assign him properties/perfections such as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent we can define in our own minds what these mean. Omnipotent, simple to understand, power over everything. If a being is unable to exert power in any situation it obviously does not hold the status of being omnipotent.

Secondly, it should be mentioned that St.Anselm developed to Ontological argument. The first uses the claim that existence is a property, that is it is greater to exist in the mind and reality than to just exist in the mind. Anselm himself realized a problem with this argument, which Kant would later explain, in that existence is not a property merely "a metaphysically necessary condition for the instantiation of any property". So his second version, the one quoted earlier by asaris, uses necessary existence as a property.

Nice to see such active participation on this thread, thanks!

X has no intrinsic maximum? Says who? How does a "being" have an absolute and universal gague of greatness, and an argument does not?

How can X have intrinsic maximum? The context alone in which you use 'x'--as a proof--shows that it does not have intrinsic maximum. A proof can not possess intrinsic maximum.

You tell me what we are gauging the greatness of "X" by.

The ontological argument is extremely application specific. It was designed as an answer to the existence of the greatest possible being which no greater can be conceived. With that title this being is immediately associated with the properties of ominpotent, omniscient..etc. These are the attributes that have intrinsic maximum.

If you claim x to be omniscient, omnipotent etc. then x is merely a place holder for god (a + 2 = 4, a still equals two regardless of what you call it). For by definition the greatest possible being which no greater can be conceived is god.

You can try to explain God through the eye of flesh or the eye of mind all you want, but it will not work. It is like trying to do a math problem using the 5 senses.

nietzsche - the proof, however, works so long as your concept is defined by all and only properties with intrinsic maxima (I'm not sure that our concept of God fulfils this, but never mind). So all CSFlim has to do is define a concept which fulfils this, ensuring that "existence" is in some way included, and instantly has a "proof" that it exists.

cliche--when St. Anselm uses the term "a being which no greater can be conceived" his concept of God possesses all and only properties with intrinsic maximums. Personally Im an atheist so I do not agree with any definition of what his or anyone else's god is. But since Anselm defines what he means by god his argument stays sound.

True if CSflim can think of an ojbect/concept that possess all intrinsic maximums then, yes, he can use the Ontological argument to prove its existence. My question is this: what is that object/concept?

nietzsche - I think CSflim's object needs simply to be composed only of intrinsic maxima (one of which must be, or include existence); I'm sure we can come up with something without falling into the "but that's God then" trap.

But my main argument with Anselm is that he is, as you say, defining God using only properties with these maxima - but you have to be very careful to only specify properties with these maxima; the moment you specify something else the argument falls apart like searching for "the largest number". So I'd like to see Anselm's "God" specified a bit more exactly.

If anyone can think of an object that is defined only by properties which have intrinsic maximum, and more importantly possess the intrinsic maximum of these properties please let us know.

The Ontological Argument was put forth by St. Anselm in a work entitled "Proslogium", I have not read this work. It;s possible that St. Anselm goes into greater detail in defining his concept of God.

I was thinking about the omniscient brain in a vat situation.

If the biav really was omniscient (aka knows everything) then it would know "how to get a beer if you were a brain in a vat." Otherwise that would be something it wouldn't know - making it not omniscient.

Therefor omniscient infers omnipotence, because you would know how to accomplish anything in any situation with any amount of resources.

This whole 'Ontological Argument' discussion had made believe that concepts such as 'perfect' and 'omni~' are just barely concepts, let alone anything applicable.

Marburg - my point is that it might know that it's impossible for it to get a beer. I mean, assuming we take the laws of thermodynamics as given (if not, substitute your own favourite unbreakable law of maths/physics/anything), but the brain would know that "you can't get (and keep - for those who want to talk about vacuum energy) energy out of nothing". It doesn't make physics professors any less knowledgeable that they know something cannot be done.

However, if you believe that there is no unbreakable law then you and Moonduck are right - but then think about a BIAV that wants to make 2+2=5 or something!

I think Paley's teleological argument is stronger (not withstanding Gaunilo's "perfect island" reply)

Brd99boy - what do you like about the teleological argument?

For those that haven't heard of it, it's the "the universe is complicated so there must be a creator, just as a complicated watch must have been made by a watchmaker". Doesn't strike me as particularly strong bearing in mind things like fractals - who would have thought something as beautiful as the Mandelbrot set would have come from something as simple as z -> z*z+c?
Gaunilo's "perfect island" is what we've been discussing for a bit (as "perfect horse", CSflim's interesting "perfect proof for the non-existence of God")

your example just further supports the telelogical argument - the universe is far more complicated than a watch which means it is even more unlikely to have happened without design

cliche
I made an error when I said Gaunilo's "perfect island" was the reply to Paley. Wormsley Glen (where everyone had an alarm clock with the exact time for each individual to awake) was the reply to Paley

Cliche, how many times in the history of man have we come up with some axiom based on empirical observation, only to rpove much later that it was a false assumption, and that what was observed was innaccurate? Aristotle'sclassification work was accepted whole cloth for quite some time until some bright boy postulated a better system (I'm no scientist to recall who came with the modern genus/order/species/etc system, and far too lazy to look it up).

Simply because our inherently limited persepective sees something as impossible, why would you assume that an entity whose perspective infinitely exceeds ours would not also see what we think of as impossible is actually simply difficult, or perhaps even easy? Again, I say that when one brings in such absolutes as omniscience, one cannot rationally limit said concept. Knowing everything is fairly unlimited after all.

Moonduck - I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of things that would seem possible now that might be in the future; I just don't agree with your assertion that anything is possible, by an individual, regardless of situation (even lacking arms etc). What if "the way" for the BIAV to 'unlock the telekinetic potential of its mind' involved use of a tinfoil hat. The BIAV could sit quite happily knowing it could have telekinesis, except for the lack of hat. (or insert more palatable example, you can see where I'm going)

All I am saying is that knowing that something is impossible is a form of knowledge. You said earlier that the BIAV must 'know how to do X' because 'Otherwise that would be something it wouldn't know - making it not omniscient' - but what if it simply knows that it can't be done.

I agree that we can be limited, and that things we currently consider impossible might one day be realised to be so - but you seem to be making the very strong claim that not only is nothing impossible, but that everything is possible for everyone.

Alternatively, it could be that you have found a flaw with the concept of omniscience:

assumption 1 - 'x is omniscient' means that for all actions A, x knows how to do A (aka Moonduck's assumption ;) )
assumption 2a - there exists at least one action, B, and one person, y, such that is impossible for y to do B (aka cliche's weak assumption)
- or -
assumption 2b - there exists at least one action, B, such that for all persons y, it is impossible for y to do B (cliche's strong assumption)

(I like this bit because we get to use our ideas together rather than arguing as we have been doing :) ):

Combining 1 + 2a : it is impossible for y to be omniscient; for if we claim he knows everything we fall into the trap you mentioned earlier: 'Otherwise that would be something it wouldn't know - making it not omniscient'

Combining 1 + 2b (my favourite) : omniscience is impossible

What do you think?

Brdd99boy - not convinced; are you claiming that 'z -> z*z+c' is complicated? Or are you claiming that God made the equation work out in that beautiful way - that God is above the realm of logical possibility rather than 'only' physical possibility. In short, that God could make 2+2=5 (OMG, potential major arguments/debate starting here! ;) )

Also, any chance you could spell out the Wormsley Glen argument? I'm not sure if I've heard it.

The question would then arise, cliche, what it means for B to be an action, if it is such that there is no agent who can perform B. It seems to me that for some x to be an action, there has to be a possible agent y who can perform x. To put it slightly differently, I would want to maintain that, for all actions x, there is a possible agent y, such that y can perform x.

I agree with asaris, for x to be even considered an action there MUST be a person(s) capable of performing that action.

With this reasoning we can assume that walking down the street is a logical action while walking perpendicular up a wall, without any aid, is not, or at least not until someone is able to accomplish it.

In my opinion, omniscient and omnipotent are completely independent. Say I am omniscient (yay go me) and I know that a country is about to launch a nuclear weaopn at another. This knowledge does not in itself give me the power to stop this attack, unless you want to go into the somewhat gray area that mankind hs not yet unlocked a power in his brain to control objects/people through thought. I don't want to bring the realm of supernatural powers into this philosophical debate.

My point is omniscience does not infer omnipotence.

cliche
Wormsley Glen (the name of a village)
A person like Paley visited Wormlsey Glen and he noticed that everyone had an alarm clock that was preset and everyone in the village had an alarm clock that was set to go off at the exact time to enable every one to get up eat breakfast and get to work on time. Every one went to work at a different time. The villagers explained that they found a pile of alarm clocks that someone (apparently God) had put there and amazingly everyone had picked the right alarm clock that went off at the exact time they needed.
He concluded that was too much of a coincidence to be random and it was by magnificant design. But what he did not know was there were only 200 people living in Wormsley GLen at that time but there had been 200,000 people living there when they found the pile of alarm clocks and 99.9% of the people picked up alarm clocks that did not go off at the right time and they got to work at the wrong time and got fired and starved to death. What he saw was only what remained after the 199,800 had died off.
Many say that when we see what appears to be a perfectly designed universe, they don't realize that there are many imperfections in the universe but the imperfections don't survive and we don't see all the imperfecton.

cliche
The complexity of the universe can be understood only at the subatomic level. It is complex enough that no one fully understands it yet.
Someone (God) made the subatomic particles and designed them in such a way as to combine and form the basic atoms of the elements. Because of these amazing subatomic particles the elements form the ionic and covalent bonds that create all the compounds and molecules in our world.
The equations (math, chemistry, or physics) are nothing more than an aid to help understand what we observe

not much time this am, will try to write more this pm, but:

x travels through flat space at 800miles/second
x travels through flat space at 1600miles/second
x travels through flat space at... keep increasing

I'll try to find better examples later. If not, then so long as we assume "walking perpendicular up a wall" has meaning, I'm quite happy to accept another word than "action" if you'll supply me one.

and nietzsche - I was attempting to show exactly the same thing as you; that omniscience and omnipotence are different things. However, during conversation with moonduck I noticed that perhaps we could combine things to suggest that omniscience is impossible.

Crap, walking perpendicular up a wall is an action so long as you consider spiders and other insects beings.

My point is, an action that cannot be achieved by any being is not an action at all, merely an IDEA in the mind.

The impossibility of ominscience is going to take some thought. I think it is key to remember that any being that is omniscient is god, in the concept that humanity in general understands what god is. So proving the impossibility of omniscience would corelate to the proving the impossibility of a god.

My point was not that an action has to be something performable by an actual being, but only by a possible being. (If you'll ignore my ignorance of science), seeing through walls is an actions, because there is a possible being who can do that (X-Ray vision or something). However, there is no actual being who can do that (as far as I know).

First comment: Mondays suck, and Tuesdays aren't much better. I've been too bloody busy to keep up with this thread.

Second comment: This is an amazing conversation. Bravo!

I would say that BIAV simply uses amazingly persuasive discourse learned via omniscience to convince its' Nazi servitors to install said beanie =) Again, I said that omniscience implies omnipotence, but that it does not guarantee instant gratification. That brain is gonna have to sweat! Well, perhaps its' lackeys will sweat for it.

Yes, I'm joking =)

Again, omniscience is ALL knowledge. To me, this means that one would know the path/actions to get whatever desired result one wishes to accomplish, even given limited capacity. It is, simply put, another level of existence from ours.

Given sufficient knowledge and work, anything is possible. I said it, I mean it. There is a quietly implied caveat in that statement, however. It lies in the word "sufficient". Omniscience implies sufficient knowledge as it is all knowledge. I allow that it is possible that a being may be unwilling to take the steps necessary to utilize perfect knowledge. I am still of the opinion that omniscience is not truly omniscience if it is not the all knowledge, including how to surpass one's own limitations.

As I tend to dislike absolutes, seeing this makes me happy.

Nice structure. I like it so far!

I think you've got something. As I said previously, any discussion on such things as omniscience strays into Ludicrous Territory as readily as a discussion that includes a BIAV. If we show that omniscience is logically impossible, which I accept, I think we reach a conclusion we are both satisfied with

Good show!

Is it possible to prove omniscience is impossible without being omniscient?

To be omniscient a being must know everything about everything correct? And to prove an omniscinet being is impossible we must know everything about it (its physics, nature, properties etc) and what it is that makes it impossible. If we knew everything about an omniscient being, wouldn't we ourselves be omniscient?

Im not sure if this is a sound idea, I was just thinking about it at work today.

i haven't read any of this thread, but let me just say you can prove something (logically) without knowing everything about it or knowing every case. for example, you can know Pi is irrational without knowing every digit in order to check. just an example.

I would say that knowing everything about an omniscient being is unnecessary to prove it not omniscient, nor do I think that knowing everything about said being would make one omniscient. It would simply make one amazingly knowledgable about one being.

I wish I had time to actually contruct an argument.

I know God exists but I am not so sure that we do….That is why the Matrix scared me so…I think that we are just a dream….. silly me...

All Im saying is that to discredit a being as omniscient we must be of equal or greater intelligence.

The problem is point one: That the definition of God makes God the greatest possible being. I think when people, even people who ardently believe in God, call God a being, they are being sloppy. God is, so far as I can tell from broad reading in comparative religions, the consciousness of all that exists and does not exist. It's more a property than a being.

Tophat665 we are using Anselm's definition for a god in this argument. Obviously everyone has a varying definition of what a god is to them. The Ontological argument's first point is that "God is a being which no greater can be conceived" It does not necessarily say that this is the god that fair amount of society has come to believe in, just that we coin the being which think to be omniscient and omnipotent, god.

I do agree with your definition in part though!

Lao Tzu told a story once about the great master Con Fu'Tze confounded by the question of a dolt. One of the greatest Chinese Buddhist scholars was the Buddhist Layman Peng, well known for arguments which had established Buddhist masters stumped for answers or comebacks. One needs neither to be great, intelligence, nor well educated, one merely needs to be sufficiently observant to discredit a great being.

I looked through this thread briefly, and am sad that I am so late to the party. There are a number of mistakes made with respect to possible world semantics. But the problem is in the accessibility relation that is defined between the worlds. If we are to assume that every world is accessible from every other world, then it is true that if some statement is necessarily true at one world, then it is true at every other world. But only if our accessibilty relation is defined this way.

When I was studying modal logic, we looked into this problem, and the only thing that can be concluded, using first order modal logic at least, is that if god possibly exists, then god exists necessarily. Or in longhand: if there is a possible world in which god exists, then god exists in every possible world. We can conclude that, but you still have to show me that there is a possible world in which god exists.

dexlargo - I think we've been assuming S5 (or at least S4) in terms of modal logics. And I guess the argument you quote (if God exists, He exists necessarily) has the same form as the one we've been discussing - ie 'existing in all possible worlds is better than existing in one' vs 'existing is better (more perfect) than not existing'...

i'm somewhat mystified by what this thread is attempting to prove...it's very intresting, but i think it's overstated it's goals.

I'm afraid that's a bit of a fallacy. Some people believe God is omniscient. Disproving omniscience cannot prima facie disprove God, becuase that would assume that that limited group of people was correct, that the only thing that could be God is all knowing.

that said, continue to have at it...

Well, I said earlier, anything that's God has to have all perfections. If omniscience is impossible, it's hardly a perfection, so God doesn't have to have it. There are several Christian philosophers who believe something like this. They think that knowledge of the future is incompatible with free will, so God doesn't know the future, he's just a really good guesser (well, that's a bit unfair, but it's not a bad summary).

I never could get past the concept of "being". I gave up on trying to understand what Parmenides etc. meant by "is"...YIKES I sound like Pres.Billy Boy.