Aristotle question
 

Is anyone here a big Aristotle buff? If so, can you answer me this:

As rain is not for the sake of corn, but causes the growth of corn incidentally, so are teeth, in that they are not for nutrition but cause it by accident.

Aristotle opposes this view, stating that what happens all and for the most part can not be by accident, but must be by nature and for something.

My question is: "Why either by accident or by nature, and why if by nature then for something?"

And does he also oppose the view that rain causes the growth of corn by accident, and think, rather, that rain is for the growth of corn?

Physics Book 2 Chapter 8

Aristotle defined science before Decartes redefined science. To Aristotle all objects had 4 causes. Material/form/(I forget) and final cause.

Take a piece of chalk: material = white chalk, form = cylinder, (I forget), and final cause = to be used on a chalk board.

Descartes said we need to dismiss the 3rd and 4th cause from science.

I haven't read the Physics, but I would guess that Aristotle believes that the final cause of teeth is to aid in nutrition. I'm not really sure what the final cause of rain is, but it might certainly include the growing of corn.

The third cause that was omitted by RedbeardUH is the efficient cause, the proximal source of motion or change.

Thanks.

Here I have expanded on my questions, you guys probably wouldn't know but I hope someone does:

He says that it is the regularity of things in nature that excludes the role of chance in their happening. For instance, that teeth always or for the most part are suitable for chewing must mean that they cannot happen by chance.

Or am I wrong and it is not that teeth are always suitable, but that they are always present in animals. Anyway, you can see how the rain/corn thing parallels this example, so does that mean it is not by chance that the rain causes the corn to grow?

Also, on luck, when going to the market and unexpectedly repaying a debt, is going to the market for the regular reasons the luck, and that by virtue of concurrance this is the cause on repaying the debt, or is the going to the market to repay the debt the luck, and by virtue of concurrence it is also the regular reason for going. In the analogy of the builder building a house and a flute player also building a house by virtue of concurrence, which is the builder and which is the flute player when it comes to going to the market and repaying a debt.

The problem of Aristotle is that he says rain IS for corn, therefore rain OUGHT to be for corn. It is the Is/ought fallacy that Hume points out.

Darwin's theory of natural selection and evolution show how chance (genetic mutations) can be formed into a rule (natural selection as a result of their benefit).

The D's theory fits in with your "Or am I wrong..." comments. And yes, Aristotle would say that it was NOT chance that rain causes corn to grow.

I don't understand what you're saying in the last paragraph, however

You're going to have to remind me a bit more about Aristotle's theory of concurrence (or where it is); I can probably answer that, but my Aristotle's a bit rusty.

Oh, and Hume was wrong :D

In what way was Hume wrong about the Is/Ought exception? I've only seen one argument for it and it failed upon inspection. I was unaware that anyone had figured a way past it.

Aristotle's position is essentially there's an ought built into the is. If there's something 'ought-ish' built into 'is-ish-ness', then the inference is a valid inference. You are, of course, entitled to deny the first premise, that the ontological is somehow ethical, but that's not the same thing as saying that it's an invalid inference. I didn't say anything more, because I didn't want to hijack the thread, and I suggest we not go any further down this road.

By all means, go ahead. I'm almost finished with my paper.

Yes, and Aristotles position is unsound. It might be valid, but its not sound. Aristotle was a big fan of deductive logic and he would have said inferences are never a good idea.

An example of what A would argue is such:

Sex's final cause is reproduction
Therefore sex ought to only be used for reproduction

Empirically, there is nothing about sex that says it ought to be used for reproduction.

Clearly sex can be more than just reproductive. He would have said (and did, I believe) sex for pleasure was immoral