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By the way, by definition, science doesn't have theorems, as such. They're pretty much the realm of mathematics only and for good philosophical reasons that I can explain but would probably be better placed in Tilted Knowledge... Quote:
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I got a little pissy (but only a little) because you feigned thnking (with your "hmm" remark) and then utterly mangled the meaning of a sentence. This annoyed me... Quote:
What was strange about my statement? You could have talked about that instead of... Well, you totally misinterpreted my sentence so I guess it didn't matter what you said after that... Quote:
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As far as your conviction that your belief is summed up as neatly as the law of gravity, I beg to differ. I understand that to you the truth of atheism is crystal clear, but to those of us who don't share your conviction and have witnessed similar declarations from those who are equally convinced of the truth of their own beliefs, I'm sorry to tell you this, but your conviction as expressed is only slightly more compelling. And, I have to say this and I don't mean it in a offensive way, I suppose your insistence that we should default to your understanding of things and move forward from there just as, for example, fundamentalist Christians do rubs me wrong way a little. As if to say because I don't believe in Santa Claus, I have no reason to not to be an atheist. Just as a Christian might tell me that because I have a conscience there must be a god. Surely you can see that your conviction begins and ends with you just as anyone else's. Quote:
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And, as for myself, I don't feel I need to have purpose for my own life, I'm just open to the idea that perhaps there is a purpose for the existence of mankind. That's all. I have not given myself over to any belief other than the belief that there are things I don't know with certainty. |
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It seems to be common in the basic undestanding of the term faith, that it is only applied to theism, and not to atheism, even though the two perspectives do not require proof. Quote:
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And to summarize, 1) belief in God, requires faith. There is no requirement to prove that God exists. 2) belief in no God also requires faith. There is no requirement to prove that God does not exist. |
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I don't know how literal your examples were meant to be but saying that our "conscience" is evidence of God makes as much sense as saying the colour blue is evidence of Him. Santa Clause and God are both fairy tales told to us by another person. If you can't see this then there truly is nothing I can say that can persuade you of anything you don't already want to believe. Quote:
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For a change of pace, I will try something new and adopt your meaning of the word "faith," which seems to be (and correct me if I'm wrong) the literal meaning of believing in something. So, I have faith that my TV remote control will fall to the floor if I let go of it. As another side note (I seem to enjoy them), by definition, nothing in science is ever proven. Again, proof is something that pretty much only exists in mathematics. We merely have good evidence that some theory appears to model reality well or we don't. Some theories are better supported than others. Scientists have a lot of faith that the good theories are accurate while being more tentative with their faith for unsubstantiated theories. Bad theories are simply disbelieved... Quote:
It is my contention that it takes far more faith to believe in God than it does to not believe in Him. My approach to an argument will be that of common sense. This is, in fact, a new approach for me. I've been employing it throughout this entire thread and I will continue to do so 'cause I have faith (quite a leap, this time) that it can work. The notion of God, such as the Christian one, makes about as much sense as any other fairy tale. If I appear to harp on Christianity a lot, it's only because it is the most prevalent religion in my part of the word (as well as most of the posters in this thead) and the one I know best since I was brought up in it. It's hard for me to discuss specifics with other religions since I don't know them well or at all. I can expand on this argument but, for brevity's sake, I think it will actually do for now. I think we can all agree that events in the Bible are as contrary to common sense as any other fairy tale. Hopefully, you will agree that they are as believable and, thus, require more faith to believe than not... |
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As a result I see no need to believe in God any more than I do the Easter Bunny. |
"I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer gods than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." - Stephen F. Roberts
I just really like that quote. |
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BUT, being back in the real world, I give respect to the fact that there are very reasonable people practicing the world's religions. And for many of them, the stories in scripture and other religious texts are not what gives them their faith. It is experience and wisdom and reflection. So I stand back and give them room for their beliefs and I respect them. Just as I respect yours. If your atheism prevents you from doing that then to me you are no different in attitude than the evangelists and proselytizers of Christianity. Quote:
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Man, go away for a job interview and you miss so much...I've tried to catch up on the thread's discourse, but I may miss something.
Re: incidental side discussion with Knife et al - I was simply reacting to a line of commentary that could easily be interpreted by those with religious beliefs as being condescending. It doesn't really matter - it's hard to capture and interpret others meanings via online posts, and its not particularly a big deal. Both sides of this discussion can feel condescension in the other side's position, as it tends to attack their fundamental worldview at its elemental position. The funny thing, to me, is that at the root level, I tend to pretty much agree with KnifeMissile basic assertions. I don't understand how people hold to deities at this point. I don't think KnifeMissile is "mean" at all - just very direct and perhaps not always "user-friendly." ;) As I see it, philosophy is basically the study of everything. Philosophy isn't limited to the study of hoky claims that can never be substantiated - its the umbrella term for the investigation and classification of all knowledge. In this sense, science is simply a sub category of philosophy. This is inherent in the fact that the highest degree you can achieve in scientific education is a Ph.D. - a Doctor of Philosophy. I used to get a huge kick out of all the grad students in engineering and various scientific areas of study who had such huge derision for philosophy. "Yeah, good luck loser. Try and get a job with that. I don't know if it will come in handy after you get your degree, but I like my latte with extra cream, and not too hot." You then ask them what degree program they're in. "Oh, I'm finishing up my Ph.D. dissertation." Oh really? Self-loathing much? As far as I understand it, personified deities probably made terrific sense a long time ago. You're trying to figure out what all this experience and existence stuff means, why you're here - all the classic questions - and in doing so a hypothesis is formed. People reasonably conclude they are the top dogs in the local area, and if they are being acted upon by forces out of their control, well a super-person would be a pretty decent guess as to who's poking them with sticks. Such a belief system would serve its purpose and let them move on to hunting some buffalo, smoking some herb and drinking a beer, getting it on, etc. I just think that hypothesis has outlived its usefulness. As far as I can see, there is no good reason to presuppose the existence of any personified deity. I don't think that makes the pursuit of the questions that were represented by those deities any less useful, only that the face of those questions has changed. (Nevermind the anthropomorphic use of the word 'face' :) ) We've always been aware of the limitations of our knowledge - its how we deal with it. We used to shovel it all over on "God" or "gods." Why does the world turn? Don't kow, that's God's job. Why do good things happen to bad people? Beats me, talk to God. Now the atheist just tends to say "Don't know." My personal problem with particularly strong atheistic positions is the notion that study of the physical universe is all that matters, period. There are so many questions that such studies can't answer, and therefore the strict atheist says "I don't care about the other questions. Waste of time." Which I think is fine, but it doesn't mean that the pursuit of questions and answers outside the purview of physical science are a waste of time for everybody, just that they don't care to pursue them. However, it seems that in pursuit of the answers to questions which we may view as being outside the realm of "classic scientific inquiry," we tend to slowly move knowledge from "bullshit philosophy" into "classic scientific knowledge." Many of the areas that we now think we understand and accept as having explanations were once the strict purview of mystics and shamans. Disease, electricity, fire (me like fire), etc - we used to accept on a hyper (or maybe sub) rational level, and we now think we have a firmer grasp on them. I don't see any reason to differentiate science and philosophy - I'm not even sure what such a distinction would mean - it seems that its all pursuit of knowledge, and the means of inquiry (scientific method, more or less) is the same across the board. Incidentally, all "science" says is that one has a set of a priori theoretical hypotheses which seem to be consistent with our interpretations of our perceptions. It doesn't mean any of it is real - only that its useful. The whole thing could very well be nothing but smoke and mirrors - but its useful for making computers and bridges and such. I don't think any of the diagrams in scientific textbooks exists - they are just convenient ways for us to categorize what we think we know, so that we can move forward in making more intricate toys and tools. Out of all the potential interactions and potential causal relationships that govern our universe, we've carved out a set of theories which seem to work for us. I personally like to remind myself every so often how little we actually know - and I think that to truly accept everything in reality is to also embrace all of the aspects of reality, including those of we we have no knowledge. To me, on a fundamental level, that is one of the main purposes of relgions in the abstract. |
i actually have found the thread interesting, but hadn't really felt that i had much to add beyond the two posts i put up at the start. i read through the thread yesterday, objected to knife missle's strange use of aristotle--i was going to lay out more of it, but things got derailed. but the thread is still of interest to me, and i need a break from a work project, so here i am again.
1. on pascal's wager: the trick of that passage is rhetorical--for it to function, you have to allow yourself to be pushed around by the narrator--and in the section, as throughout the pensées, there are two, the believer and the skeptic. the wager presupposes that the believers framing of the question is compelling: this IS your situation, you MUST choose. on that, the problem is pretty obvious, even though pascal is a great writer and his writing makes as strong a case for the power of his argument as can be made: but in the end, if you accede to the frame, you are trapped in a christian way of modelling reality. the interesting thing is the other part of the wager. paraphrasing: skeptic: ok, i accept the probability argument but am made so that i still cannot believe. what should i do? believer: act as though you believe, perform the rituals, dscipline the passions, and eventually you will become like an animal (a variant of "be like unto a child") and will forget that you do not believe. so you have an argument for auto-conditioning. the source of what you believe is what you repeat. so belief follows from repetition, not the other way around. belief is an effect, not a cause. repetition wears down mediations (distancing), blurring them into background conditions. belief, a kind of immediacy, becomes possible on that basis--of the erasure of the sense of being in a mediated situation (i believe because of the probabilities) through repetition, which issues into a space of immediacy. faith is immediacy---it is the inverse of the sense of being-mediated. this is why i have not been able to decide what to make of the wager. if pascal believed this scenario to be true, and if the point of the pensées is to foster faith, then it seems to me it would be the last thing he would say explicitly. this because it reveals the device--repetition--and by doing that reduces nearly to zero the possibility that it can have the desired effect. or it stretches the space of repetition out much longer than it otherwise would be, because now you not only have to forget that you do not believe, but you also have to forget that you know the device that is going to bring you to the point of forgetting you do not believe. from this one of the points of this post: i think one thing that differentiates those who believe from those who do not is the level of awareness of belief as socially situated, as something that unfolds and an effect within particular institutional situations. i dont think it follows from any intrinsic superiority of one frame of reference over another, as if there is some sort of objective meta-scale that certain people have access to and others do not that enables judgments to be made as to which style of belief is close to "reality" and which is not. all aspects of being-in-the-world are frame contingent. all the variables stipulated within a given frame, and all the rules that enable combination and variation, move together. you criticize people operating within one frame on the basis of positions articulated within another. what might differentiate frame b from frame a is that from a viewpoint informed by b you can be aware of the extent to which positions within frame a are effects of certain parameters--rituals, assumptions, institutions, etc,.. but this does not at all mean that frame b does not itself work in the same basic way, using different organizing signifiers and different rules for combination etc.---it just means that frame b presupposes a certain distance from frame a and that one effect of that distance is that if you play in b you can sociologize a. that's it. this sets up the possibility of a regress of frames. what enables evaluation past a certain obvious point is the openness of particular ways of thinking about being-in-the-world to recursive operations. recursion/reflexivity becomes the only way of generating evaluations of the frame within which you operate, of making arguments about it, of making judgments about its effects--there IS NO OBJECTIVITY, there are only frames of ideological reference that let you do some operations while excluding others. reflexivity is not easy. philosophy is a field of inquiry that gives you ways to develop reflexivity, to structure it, with the idea of maybe using it as a set of tools that enable you to situate yourself and how you see the world around you as functions of the particular ideological contexts that FOR YOU are immediate because they are yours. this is important because the cognition is largely social and that means that this problem of one's imbrication in ideological frames of reference does not stop. you see this problem all over in scientific ideologies, and in pseudo-philosophies that lean on them more often than not in wholly naive ways. this bring sme back around to the atlan book i referenced in post 19 or something, which outlines this issue by looking at the problematic fit between types of scientific inquiry--for example that of molecular biology with that of what he refers to as macro-molecular biology--the problem is that of integrating scales of analysis--the underlying problem is created by epistemological assumptions---which scientific inquiry is shot through with, as are all other forms of human thinking. whence the problem i had with the notion that philosophy is bullshit. but wait, there is more--on the problematic notion of metaphysics that is floating about in this thread--but i need to do some more work and so am stopping here. |
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Quick questions when you get back into this: 1. What do you mean by objectivity? 2. Do you think that all comparisions between events / structures on vastly different time or length scales are invalid, from an ontological perspective? |
pigglet:
quickly quickly (sorry but i've a deadline in 3-d land)--hope what follows makes sense. 1. objectivity is a set of claims about the world that are functions of a particular ideology--that the observer is unconditioned or neutral, the the world is an accumulation of objects, that the neutral observer records the arrangement of objects and by doing that reproduces a reality that is somehow not itself a function of an ideological framework that shapes the game of objectivity and the rules for generating statements etc. 2. i am not sure what you are asking me. maybe lay out something of what you understand ontology to be and i can bounce off it as a way of explaining my positions at this level. ontology is a technical term and it crosses with the stuff i am working on at the moment, so i suspect i would just start rattling on about what i am thinking about in 3-d without something more from you to work with. it's a situational matter for me (the 3-d guy, not roachboy), this question: it is not about your post in itself (at another moment, i'm not sure that i would need to ask you for more information). |
What a provocative thread, and a reasonably civil one, given the OP topic.
As an attorney, any logic to my positions is always tainted by the desire to successfully advocate on a given issue. I'll try to put that aside here, but there still is some amount of value in looking at "god or no god" issue in that context...this isn't original, cf, "The Case For Christ", in which Lee Strobel, a "skeptic" who uses his experience as a legal affairs journalist to critically "investigate" the evidence on the issue, advances legal arguments supporting Christianity (a decent objective review is found here: http://www.infidels.org/library/mode...obel-rev.html), while Earl Doherty in "Challenging The Verdict" advances an opposing point of view. In law, there is no certainty standard. The highest degree of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases. This obviously doesn't mean that innocent people aren't sometimes convicted (i.e., the jury was wrong), but rather is an expression of our preference to try not to get it wrong too often, even at the cost of allowing more guilty persons to go free. As it relates to the god vs no god issue, I'd be happy to settle for the preponderance standard, that something more probably is true than not. Even then, I find myself stuck, in terms of providing substantiation for my own spiritual beliefs, which are hard for me to get my hands around in the first place, much less presenting an evidence based argument that god more probably than not does exist. Then there are the unavoidable semantic questions...what is meant by the term faith? (holding to a belief, in the absence of a preponderance of probative supporing evidence?)...by the term god? (impersonal? personal? specifically personal, e.g. ONLY Christian, etc?). When you wind through all of this, the result is the same. If a declaratory action were brought to prove the existence of god by a preponderance, it would fail. Similarly, if the same action were brought to disprove the existence of god to that standard, it would fail also. There just isn't sufficient PROBATVE evidence for either side to meet the preponderance burden on the issue. Since by definition we cannot know the mind or will of god, who transcends all categories of human thought, description, or understanding, we cannot know whether or not god is a factor in the creation and behavior of the universe and its inhabitants. That said, I have grown personaly skeptical that there is in fact a personal god. I share sentiments of abaya (#2) and flat5(#3) about the OP. Still, there is a sense of wonder, and of unfathomable power, about the universe which holds for me a place for faith, or something very much like it. I find myself believing that there is a reason for everything, while at the same time conceding that I'll never know what that reason is. On most days, this suffices. |
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re: objectivity - understood. the reason i asked for clarification on your definition is to make sure its consistent with mine. my studies have not been in classic "Philosophy" but I find the subject fascinating. How could I not, given my post above? I personally am a big fan of objective statements, as long as they are seen in context, etc. 2. The question about scales. If you observe phenomena at one scale, fit a theory to them that seem to fit, do you feel its useful to posit that a similar theory may pertain at other scales of time / length? The reason I ask is that I think it is a useful manner in which to proceed, once again as long as you keep track of your assumptions, in order to try to understand what you don't know, based on what you think you do. From many of your posts, I perceive that you do not share this perspective and feel it is much more likely to lead to erroneous results. Also, thanks for the reference to the book by atlan. I have only read a limited amount of philosophical works that are academically "credible," - is this guy peer-reviewed and so forth. My journal reading has been limited to other areas, but I think I'm about to have start seriously reading. Do you have any references for decent review papers on metaphysics, ontology, etc? I don't think jumping into the minutae would be useful for me at this point, but I've become wary of pop-philosophy texts and books summarizing positions. Shit, I've got some reading to do. |
Wow, this thread has been exceptionally busy, today. I have many things to say but, unfortunately, I'm quite pressed for time so I will address a pressing matter now and will come back later to respond to individual remarks...
What I'm about to demonstrate has been said before but, unfortunately, it bears repeating so I will repeat myself, here... "What these teachers propose is educational nonsense." "You mean education is nonsense? I don't get it!" How did the second speaker go wrong, here? He didn't understand that "educational" is an adjective and "nonsense" is a noun. This is a statement on nonesense (a particular instance of nonsense referred to in the sentence) and says nothing about education. Compare this exchange with this less contrived one... "...and is moving onto the topic of philosophical bullshit" "hmm...philosophy is "bullshit" but religion is serious." Where did the second speaker go wrong? Not to single him out since he certainly was not the only person to do so but this situation is perfectly analogous to the previous one. "Philosophical" is an adjective while "bullshit" is a noun. This is a statement on bullshit and says nothing about philosophy. Furthermore, there is absolutely no interpretation in the English language that can mean anything else, much less that it is a statement on philosophy. What the hell?! Now, I have many more enthusiastic (and, perhaps, positive!) things to say but they will have to wait. Until then, please think this matter through because misunderstandings based on a lack of proficiency in English distress me so. I'm not entirely sure why. If English is not your first language, I am sympathetic and can understand some confusion but I sense that, for the vast majority of you, this is your first (and only) language... |
So the bullshit discussion is all basically as to whether or not Knife feels that the particular referenced material is bullshit, while roach is assuming that Knife lumps all philosophy into a nebulous amalgam of bullshitery? Simple enough. Sounds like Knife doesn't hold that view, and should be all settled. Maybe y'all want to discuss the particular material, and its various merits of bullshit / non-bullshit?
Hmmm..I'd petition Knife to get on to those other points. I can assure you (Knife, that is) that roach's first language is indeed English, although I suspect some proficiency in French as well. If the order is reversed, then it can't be much of a separation. |
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If my assumption is in error, I look forward to your clarification. |
dear knife missle:
you have a choice to make. you could tank this thread in a useless quibble that appears to be with me (though it's hard to actually tell) or we could move on to other things. your choice. for what it's worth, i am not interested in what appears to be the buzz buzz buzz in the drum of your ear. and if i am the cause of it, mea culpa. ok? but if you want to push it, if you feel this buzz buzz buzz is important enough to keep forcing it into the discussion, then go for it. but i will stop being nice. bises. your pal roachboy THE FOLLOWING MORNING, HE AWOKE AND SAID: pigglet: the ain problem that atlan at least concentrates on with reference to questions of multiple scales of systems operating within the same(?) higher-order system is about the relations between or across scales. the argument is that the problem of integration is an effect of conceptualizing various scales/systems as discrete---so if integration comes down to a question of how a bounded system links to another at a higher level (scale wise), the problem can well be confused by thinking of these systems as discrete, or like the edges are geared and mesh somehow with other gears such that research is about stumbling across the patterns of teeth. the reason this positing of discreteness happens is a function of the assumptions that go with nouns or naming. nouns describe forms you see. rather, (here we are tipping into wittgenstein a bit) meanings are in relation to noun such that taken together they describe the characteristics of a Form (in the platonic sense): the refer to bounded entities in the world; complexity is a matter of multiple layers of discrete referrals. for wittgenstein, meanings are forms and so are metphysical. metaphysics is based on both a doctrine of form and on the assumption that the shifting world that we move through is shaped, is made meaningful, because it embodies a dimension of forms--so meanings are stable, more or less unchanging, and the world shifts (form/doxa). from this viewpoint, when you use language you shift in and out of a metaphysically oriented reconfiguration of the world. if, that is, you restrict how you understand the relation of language to the world to the representational function of language. which is one dimension of it, and is the dimension that (basically) we function within. so you cant really just say "representation is metaphysical is bad"--rather you have to think about (1) the notion that this dimension of language carves up the world in particlar ways and (2) this carving up of the world has effects so (3) an awareness of these effects can maybe be useful in trying to shift, say, be (back to atlan) research into how biological systems work and interact because (4) treating language as simply describing means that you are blind to the effects of description and so (5) a naive relation to language amounts to a way in which the logic of one system gets dragged into the logic of another around the position occupied by the observer. you could apply the same kind of logic to the question of belief in a god. god is a noun. it is a name. the word itself implies something, generates a signified, and with particular characteristics that you can isolate and think about if you are so inclined--folk invest in the signified as structured by the formal characteristics of a noun without realizing it, etc etc etc. i need more coffee. |
Okay, I'm back. Wow, there's so much to say. This will be a long post to multiple people...
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Personally, I actually have no problem with religion, in and of itself. Life is hard and whatever helps you get through the day is more power to you. However, (I wll be using the royal "you" here since obviously none of this applies to you, in particular) when your religious doctorine starts dictating what I may do then you make your religion my problem. In this case, I would prefer that you not be religious, thank you... Of course, this is the real problem. You might like to say "well, they're just extremists and should learn to respect others' opinion," but that really isn't fair to them. They're "extreme" because they truly believe and part of their doctorine is to enforce their beliefs on others for their own good (religions that have no method of procreation don't live too long. This can be a topic for another thread!). To not follow this is to not truly believe which is, again, against their doctorine (religions that have no self-defense mechanisms also have short lives). So, they must necessarily enforce their views upon me and that is when you must throw your arms up and say "okay, about your religious beliefs..." Quote:
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pigglet, your comments on philosophy are illuminating. I had totally forgotten that Ph.D.s are philosophical doctorates. Quote:
The idea of shoving everything we don't know about into some idea like God has been referred to as "living in the margins (of science)." For example, whatever we don't understand we will attribute to religious explanations. When we understand one of these religious explanations, we will pretend that it wasn't important to the religion and retreat to another margin of science. Astronomy used to be vital to Catholic doctorine but is no longer after so much of what they were saying about the stars were shown to be false... Quote:
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I could hardly tell what you were talking about for the rest of your post. I can only assume that it was all leading up to this point, here: Quote:
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Hmmm...so many things slipping around in this thread right now, I'm not sure how to respond. I'll try with the objectivity issue first. As far as I understand, it seems that one must always start somewhere in trying to make sense of this experience we are all in which we call reality. When attempting to carve up this experience, we have to cleave it somewhere in order to start talking. That very first act of cleaving what I will call "reality" into various forms is the first essential perversion of our understanding. It's absolutely necessary, and yet it inherently sets us up to inevitably describe things inaccurately. As I understand it, objectivity and objective statements are those statements where we try to imbue particular characteristics as belonging wholly to a form which is separate from ourselves. Such characteristics as length, temperature, and hardness are forms commonly used in scientific discussion. We also have subjective statements, which we use to relate to those objects we have created, and would relate things like an object being hot, or simply hard. They don't really have any meaning without the implicit assumption that you, as an observer exist. Beyond all of these descriptions we form, is the actual "thing" we are attempting to describe, which is always somewhat beyond our descriptive abilities.
I suppose that in describing these deities that seem to lie at the heart of most religions, if I understand roach's post concerning the lack of objectivity between various frames of reference - which we can adopt as being theistic and atheistic in this case, the argument would go that because different observers from different frames of reference have different sets of suppositions they are operating with, that in turn its impossible to make accurate statements about each other's visions of truth. I'm not sure I entirely agree with this position (assuming that I haven't just made it up for roach in the first place). It would seem to me that one could look at the assumptions within the different frames of reference, and try to determine which assumptions are most self-consistent. I can see where in the act of doing this, you are of course dragging into play a third set of assumptions, namely your personal set of assumptions regarding how you evaluate the two frames of reference - at that point I would tend to say that you either plough on through, or you throw your hands up in the air and give up on the whole question altogether. Throwing the problem away seems to be fairly useless to me, so that the only recourse is to continue the investigation with the caveat that you're only trying to get an answer that is "good enough." I think this gives me a departure from which to address Knife's question as to what I meant when I said I try to embrace the realization (or at least, what I perceive as my realization) that this experience in itself is not truly a splintered set of events, but can be thought of as a large unified whole. It seems most useful to me to assume that it clearly operates; anything else seems almost unimaginable. As though it were self defining, in a sense. Through the process of exploration, and what we commonly call scientific method (or maybe scientific method evolved from this process of exploration as the technique which most directly leads to self-consistent results), we have put a pretty face on this experience which allows us to function. However, the truth of the matter is beyond our comprehension, and I like to keep that in mind. Things are undoubtedly going on of which we have no knowledge - this doesn't make them less real, or less important. I suppose that in a nutshell, its eerily similar to some of the Eastern philosophies which get into the concepts that "this is that" and of "just being." Its almost an attempt to connect with and feel content with the fact that regardless of what is going on, things are as they are, and that I am a part of whatever it is. On the topic of the work of atlan, whose specific work I do not know, but whose general field (not the biology, but the mating of different time and length scales when considering physical models of the scientific phenomena) I have had some experience with, my experience is that much of it probably is inherently epistemological. Many times a mathematical model of a given process has been formulated for old problems, given the scientific understanding developed at some previous time. As new knowledge emerges, more phenomena need to be incorporated into the models. The question of how to do this is quite problematic, and is an area of heavy scientific inquiry. Typically, the time and length scales of various processes are grouped within the larger context, and then are discretized. The "conversations" between the different scales are handled via the passing of boundary conditions, and the way these boundary conditions are handled is subject not only to physical considerations, but also to numerical stability. There is much discussion as to whether or not the question of numerical stability is of any physical merit, and if knowledge of system dynamics can be gleaned from which boundary conditions actually work. It is also of note that much of this is performed for convenience of numerical solution, so as to make use of various parallel computing platforms. One chops up the problem by discretizing in space and/or time, then sends them off to different processors. Sending off different scales and iteratively trying to force a consistent and realistic solution is the newest phase of this effort. Aside from such considerations, I have read what roach would probably consider pseudo-philosophical treatises which attempt to take relationships from one physical context, and extend them into others. I suppose this happens very often in engineering, where such equations as the Chilton-Colburn analogies are used, or where simple fluid dynamics was taken as an analogous form to diffusion phenomena. It is seen, that on certain continuum scales (where discrete phenomena are not prevalently considered to have significant affects) typically the rate of action is equal to a factor multiplied by the driving force. Such laws show up in the current flow (i=kV), diffusion (flux=D*dc/dx), fluid flow (tau=mu*dv/dx), etc. I've often wondered if such analogies couldn't be used in predicting sociological phenomena (rate of change = X*driving force for change). Its probably already done in mathematical treatises on social evolution; I'm just not familiar with the work. Similar situations might pertain when trying to figure out questions like individual choice vs. predictability of an individuals actions based on social environment. I think I'm making a choice to type this, but is that really a choice? If I boil water on the stove, could individual molecules of water "think" (or some analogous function similar to what we "think" thinking is) they are making a choice to go into the gas phase, when in fact we know they are responding, on average, to a heat gradient. Etc. I guess that gets really to the heart of what I was asking roach - do you see any merit in positing such analogies? Of trying to think about whether molecules might "think" and "communicate" on their scale, while we fit their behavior with empirical models based on our scientific analysis. Ask a scientist how his system works, and he's letting his hair down, you'll catch a ton of anthropomorphism. Could there be any validity to such descriptions, or is it wholly a function of familiarity and convenience? Would aliens observing us in a big telescope be asking themselves the same questions as they lay out probability models as to which route I'll most likely take to work tomorrow? Now, how this pertains to atheism and theism? I guess I hold that theistic philosophies once were probably very good scientific models, but they seem to have outlived their use. I don't think this changes their function, or that the function they fill(ed) is of no use, but the face of that need is changing. Our descriptions of reality, both objective and subjective, are undergoing the process of change. With the advent of Western post-Enlightenment thought, newer and faster implementation of scientific and information technology, it seems that the concept of personified deities no longer works so well for us. In fact, it would seem that by extending many of the relationships from our scientific approach to thought classification, many of the seeming contradictions in the nature of "God/Gods" simply don't satisfy many people any longer. Perhaps this is from extending analogies of how we see the physical world operate, and applying it to the spiritual plane. Such statements as "If there was a God, I would kill him." seem to presuppose that relations occuring in our realm of experience would pertain to the spiritual plane. |
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I suppose my "faith" lies in science, which I firmly believe will be able to observe and explain all natural phenomena given a long enough time line for the development of adequate technology and understanding of that which we have already learned. Quote:
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Here's the part where I get inflammatory. If you choose to hate me based on this, I acccept that, but I have to get it off my chest. I believe in intelligent discourse, yet my opponnents believe unwaveringly that the ultimate truth is contained in a single anthology written over the course of thousands of years, mostly the few hundred years after the alleged life and death of a man who allegedly turned water into wine, cured lepers, and rose from the dead, none of which make any sense based on rational scientific thought. I base my arguments on provable data, they base theirs on blind faith in a bunch of hearsay that managed to make it onto paper, and even worse, they think that because it's blind faith in something unprovable, that they are better people than me. I honestly don't feel contempt for most religious people because of this, I feel pity. |
Mr.Self,
I can understand your position, but I think you have to ask yourself who is negatively affected when you become inflammatory? You very likely win no one over to your side, you probably further polarize the situation, and furthermore you're the one expanding all this energy over what you perceive to be someone else's ignorance. As my friend used to say, albeit about women and not people in general, but I still like it: "if you can't fuck 'em, fuck 'em." |
I will freely admit that I did not read all four pages of posts here. theres just to much for a noob to go through. Intolerance is intolerance. Superiority is superiority. What is being done with this "new atheism" is not much different IMHO than what pro-lifers do with their cause when they blow up an abortion clinic. Tell me your more tolerant because you don't hate a musslim just for particular book he reads, but that you are better than him because he chooses to read that book and believe what is written in and you dont and you are saying that your way is right and other ways are wrong. I really don't see the difference. I don't want to offend anyone, that is always the last thing I want to do. Please if you can really tell me how it is different for you to say that your better than someone else because you can back up what you believe with facts than for me to say that I'm better than someone else because I can back up what I believe with faith and commitment to that faith? Either way the statement is being made that, "my way is the best way because <insert claim here> and any other way is ignorant."
I'm hearing the exact same words used to support both religion and atheism. And the words are "Because I'm right." Thank whatever that we don't all have to believe the same thing. thank whatever that we have the option of choosing for ourselves how we want to think. I don't even want to do the research to find out exactly how many people over the last 250 (minus a few) have died so that we could be that way. Noone has the right to tell me that I cannot believe lin fairies and unicorns if I want to. I DO want to. I'm a little to logical to actually be able to, but I try whenever I can :D. Noone has the right to tell me that I can't. I just pray to all the unicorns in Avalon (might be getting my myths mixed up there, don't want to take the time to research it) that they never will have that right. |
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And as far as fantastic literature goes, you would necessarily have to include Judaism, and would also want to include Hinduism and Buddhism. Quote:
I edited this from "you" to "your views"...I don't oppose you, KM, eh-heh... Quote:
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pigglet:
interesting. responses.... i am not really arguing a straight relativist kind of line. i realize it looks that way as a function of the emphasis (in terms of length at least) in what i have posted on framing matters. part of that has to do with the multiplicity of addressees in this thread, really---the stuff about pascal was a riff based on stuff that knife missle had posted, which refered to the "wager" in general--so i took off from that. but things are not so simple. 1. we can know things about the world. it is not the case that we simply see the image of the world implied by the frame of reference, as if that frame was wholly self-enclosed and self-enclosing---but what we can know is ALSO conditioned by these frames because they enable the production of knowledge---background assumptions, ideological and/or philsophical assumptions lay behind the definition of objects of inquiry, how they are posited, what linkages there are between these objects and surrounding phenomena; they shape observation/experimentation at the level of definition of variables (again), procedures within experiments and (particularly) the way in which the results are generalized etc. it may be that it is because there is information that gets generated about the world that the roles and power of framing assumptions tends to disappear in "normal science"--or in routinized interrogations of the world more broadly. well that and the way in which different modes of thinking are separated from each other in the states in particular (a function of reification, or the bureaucratization of knowledge...at one level unavoidable, at another unavoidable but with conequences) there is where the references to atlan come in, and here these references also function as a shorthand for a much larger body of work...anyway, the basic claim he makes concerning the question of fit between phenomena that are observed or modelled at one scale and phenomena that are observed to modelled at, say, what appears to be an adjacent scale follow from implicit philosophical assumptions--the easiest way to see them in general is as following from a determinist ontology--that is for something to be, it must be deterimate---like a thing---the predicates that define it inhere in the object itself---if you are talking about a system, the default assumption that links to this is that systems are self-enclosed and self-enclosing and are their functioning is primarily a question of repetition of internal characteristics. the counter is that (a) biological systems are not accurately characterized in this manner at all scales and if that is the case then it follows that (b) a determinist ontology cannot simply be assumed in orienting interrogation of the world simpyl becauseon its basis one is inclined to impose criteria that hobble that interrogation so: (c) it makes sense to reconsider the framing assumptions--and here i start to move into a broader area (there are tons of references i could give if you like--like the work of francesco varela on "chaotic systems" (a term i dont like particularly, but which functions) and the brain activity that underpins cognition or the work of cornelius castoriadis (who studied with for a while))---anyway, it makes sense to consider a partial determinacy model at the ontological level rather than defaulting to a determinist ontology as folk in general do. partial determinacy opens up space for thinking about the processes whereby meaning is fashioned in ways that determinist ontology does not--partial determinacy is about the processes of bringing-into-being as the bringing-into-meaning of phenomena, such that you really cannot separate the objects defined from the processes of definition. this is the kind of stuff i work on in 3-d...but mostly with reference to social-historical phenomena---my stuff moves this framework in other directions than does atlan. anyway, there we are. (2) conversation about this kind of stuff in the context of a thread like this is necessary quite abstract, and the topic is pitched such that if you want to move from area to area--which you would do because you want to link something about the tendency to believe in some god to features of how we tend to understand the world more generally--you need to be even more abstract than usual. so the linkage back to this religion thing would go this way: you could say that humans operate through a vast range of frameworks and that these frameworks can be differentiated by the status, density and complexity of feedback loops provided them by the way in which they bring themselves into contact with phenomena that are beyond themselves. all them are conditioned by effects generated by the language they use, the rules that condition their relation to that language etc...a version of the previous point is simplest here: the extent to which these structuring relations carve up information generated varies with the type of feedback loop, or with the type of observation or processing being done. (as i am writing this, i am getting bothered by restricting this to language as i am doing--the only reason for it is that i am trying to explain something about this view in a messageboard...it is a constraint. work within the constraint. it is irritating, this constraint, and a messageboard provides no space for breaking because it IS the constraint) christianity seems to me oriented entirely by assumptions particular to inherited ontology and the metaphysics that is of a piece with it. it seems to me to be entirely about the structuring characteristics of naming---for example, the universe is singular because the noun "universe" generates that singularity. there is a single god because the name god entails singularity. that god is the inverse of ourselves--we die and so are finite, so god is eternal and/or infinite. we of course have no idea of the contents of the infinite, but act as though we do because we operate through a space carved up by the implications of the words we use. that's why if i were to be a christian i would be a nominalist. people believe in a world of names, because thre are names, because one of the things we do is naming...pascal was a nominalist, nietsche was a nominalist....the categories that structure christianity are generated via processes of semantic inversion, they refer to the processes that generated them, not to anything outside them. the notion that the world is fully knowable is an illusion that is a function of inherited ontology. now to say that is not to claim that we know nothing--that is part of the same logic, just turned on its head--rather we know the world as we frame it, and these frames do not and cannot result in certainty--BUT they can and do result in knowledge----BUT that knowledge is not and cannot be complete, any more than a formal language system can be complete (this could slide into related matters concerning how and why formal systems are not groundable, are not closed and cannot be---problems of the relation to axoims to the proofs they enable for example, or the effects of stuff like godels theorem for mathematical systems--but no matter) we DO know something of the world, and we CAN know more and know it differently and over time probably will know it differently. we can organize data, we can work out criteria that let us arrive at judgments, we can develop criteria that enable us to come to agreements about that knowledge across particular frames of reference--but that agreement is about the power of the arguments, not about certainty. what we know is provisional, really. this does not mean that we know nothing. it just means that interrogatin should not stop--and that philosophical interrogation is of a piece with other types, and also should not stop, simply because philosophy gives *one* route to isolating the macro-scale assumptions that orient how local systems operate, what they produce and how they produce it.) we MAKE the meanings that we think we find. a view of these processes shaped by a partial determinacy model would prevent you from making any strict separation between information about the world and the procedures through which it was generated. criminy. another long fucking post. once again, i am not sure how clear this all is simply because it is done within a constraint that i do not find particularly generative. this is why i generally do not go in this direction in tfp-land: i dont think the format allows for it. this is not about the community, but about the form the community assumes to operate. this is also one reason i do not use caps--it reminds me not to go here in this context by keeping my voice informal. maybe now you see why. i dunno. |
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Is god metaphysical? We don't know. Up to know, as a race, we have been unable to take a measure of God. Nor can we even determine if there is no God. Does the fact that we have been unable to do this make God metaphysical? Beyond our physics perhaps, Utlraphysical? who knows. So to further elaborate on Knifemissile's gravitational behaviour analogy, we can prove consitantly that objects with mass will be attracted to gravitational forces. But there is a starting point in accepting the science of this. This is the faith in the scientific method, and its repeatability. The monsters, remote controls, cokes etc are all red herrings. You may not need to believe in God, but that doesn't make you an atheist, because you are not stating that you believe that there is No god. Rather, it makes you an empiricist, a scientist and therefore an agnostic. Quote:
And... this is my contention. Since you are not looking for proof/ evidence what have you, you are happy to take the existance of God on faith. Yes scientists have faith in the scientific method, but you said it yourself, the intent of that method is to provide a working model, until something else can replace it (if possible). Faith in the details of the theories is not required or demanded. Repeatable, observable experiments are what are required to substantiate the theories. Again, the mosters, and gravity are red herrings when taken against the grand scale. |
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roach,
i'm cogitating and taking care of mindless tasks in meat-space. for now, this threads needs a little http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y29...er_assault.gif |
roach et al Ok - just a little something quickly in response to the bit on objectivity, relativism, and meaning in the way we perceive the world.
it seems to me that we have to separate the subject matter at hand. the first part is the world the way it "really is." this world is beyond our ability to comprehend, understand, or truly analyze and grasp. what we are left with is the second part - the world as we perceive and interpret it. in this sense, i think i agree with what you posted above. i despise what i consider to be the relativistic position, in that it seems to desire to attribute everything away to useless semantics, and in the end there is no knowledge, only feelings and desires. i think this is a criticism with merit on our interpretations of reality, but not of reality itself. and while it has merit, i suppose i see it as something of a winnowing process, whereby the danger is in throwing away the projections of reality as if they had no use, when i believe it is more a question of being aware...of what you think you are aware of. in as far as we agree that we create intepretation and meaning, which i suppose is inherent in our naming processes - and not the things we are attempting to actually name, then i hold a similar position to your own, as far as i understand it. some naming conventions would seem to be be better than others, in the sense that they seem more consistent - but this doesn't make them true. they are only as good as we can do, at the present, given what we think we know. that "given what we think we know" is always the stickler, i suppose. i can also understand what i'm guessing (and it is guessing) is the root issue of the work of atlan. essentially, what if we had cut it up differently to start with? or what if we moved the different scales we've been trained to perceive to new cutting point now, and see which part of the intepretations hold, and which don't. unfortunately, i can also see how this might very easily come to involve essentially "reinventing the wheel," as the way we have discretized phenomena at this point is firmly grounded in the assumptions we made to start with. at the end of the day, a part of me wants to simply go to "does it work?" i'm guessing atlan is looking at systems where it may not be "working." i would guess that in the biological systems he is interested in, there is not such a clear distinguishing line that affords clear boundary conditions to disparate models. this happens in non-biological systems too - but i think frequently its exploded. at many material interfaces, there is a clear boundary at the scale of cm -> micrometer. but if you build up to the scales of an entire working system, such as a building or a factory or an integrated chemical system - the question of where you draw your boxes becomes much more artificial, in as far as i can tell. same thing when you go down to sub-picometers and such. i think this moves over to my personal criticism of most religions, in that they are so slow to incorporate new knowledge - they are so inflexible. i think this is at least partially a result of them having been originally formed in times where information generation and communication mechanisms were inherently slower. a slow reaction to new information was probably pragmatic at a time when information itself was slow. this is no longer seemingly the case - and while there is certainly something to be said for not bouncing around too much in the message at hand in your religion or philosophical stance, modern theological positions still seem to me to be tied down too much to stagnant belief systems and accepted common "knowledge." i don't personally care if my interpretions, on a philosophical stance that might approach "spiritual" are correct, but only if they seem to work "enough" for me. As I said, when it comes to such things, embracing the knowledge that I don't know anything provides something of a conduit to try to skip interpretation, but that's a much murkier thing. Probably bordering on psuedo-philosophy ;) that might be interesting: do you think its possible to go beyond "knowledge?" is the reality that these forms of knowledge try to capture capable of being interfaced, or even appreciated, in a way that might set a framework for spirituality - or for understanding analogs of what religions most likely evolved from? does our desire for knowledge destroy our ability to appreciate the constant process of the evolution of reality and the trailing process of creating meaning in a spiritual sense? i guess what i'm saying is that i don't have any problem with what i think the guys who must have started these religions were doing. they were interested in deep questions, and they grabbed ahold of what knowledge they had, wrestled with it until they felt they had pinned it down as best as they could, and they spread their interpretation. what i have a problem with is the notion that we have to hold on to these messages as anything other than another perspective, and the tendency we have to recite passages of knowledge that we really have no way to accurately interpret as though we didn't create whatever interpretion we're pulling out of them. it just seems pointless to me, ergo why i can't do any theistic approach i've been exposed to. |
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