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I assume at least some of our actions carry genuine moral weight -- that is, they are genuinely praiseworthy or blameworthy. Now, it is clear that for us to be responsible for an action, we have to be the cause of that action. I can't justly be blamed for something someone else does. But we generally extend this thought even further -- if someone is coerced, we usually think of the person coercing as the one really responsible. The simplest way we can think of this is that we are only responsible for an action if it is "up to us." Whatever makes an action up to us is what I mean by free will.
I generally think that this requires some form of libertarianism -- that is, for an act to be free, the agent must be genuinely able to choose to perform an action or refrain from performing an action (note that it does not mean that both choices have to be equally open). But the analysis in the first paragraph is, for me, the more fundamental analysis.
(And, yes, I know we've discussed this before. But it's been a while, and we have some new people floating around here.)
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"Die Deutschen meinen, daß die Kraft sich in Härte und Grausamkeit offenbaren müsse, sie unterwerfen sich dann gerne und mit Bewunderung:[...]. Daß es Kraft giebt in der Milde und Stille, das glauben sie nicht leicht."
"The Germans believe that power must reveal itself in hardness and cruelty and then submit themselves gladly and with admiration[...]. They do not believe readily that there is power in meekness and calm."
-- Friedrich Nietzsche
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