Kostya

Gentlemen,

I don't quite see why you are so forcibly making a point that I have freely conceded, namely, that adoptive parents can be horrible parents. I said it quite clearly here:

I am in no way making a claim that all adoptive parents are responsible. My claim is, and always has been merely this:

If the adoptive parents are responsible folk, then it is better for the child than abortion.

I completely agree with Spindle's assessment here:

In fact I think it is one of the most important words in a discussion about ethics. Because, in ethics, we are not so concerned with what is, but with what ought to be. If statement do not tell us very much about the state of affairs in the world very often, but they do illuminate very well the relations between those things. For instance, take my example of the choice between an infant and a dolphin's life, it's clear that such a scenario is incredibly unlikely, but we are not called upon to consider its likelihood or its actual occurence, merely to imagine what if we were placed in that position. Our answer tells us a great deal about how and why we value human life.

So for instance, Spindle's example:

Tells us what ought to be, namely, that Spindle's ought to have bought better locks for his house. Of course, since it is phrased in the past tense, it is of no value. But imagine that it was three days prior to te robbery and asked Spindles 'What if your house was going to be broken into in three days?' and we determined after some dicussion the following conclusion: "If Spindles buys better locks for his house it will not be broken into three days from now or in fact any time in the conceivable future." Now we know what Spindle's ought to do if he does not want his house to be susceptible to breakins.

This is why I do not shirk from utilising 'if' propositions a great deal in our current discussion, because I wish to determine what it is we ought to do with regard to abortion.

For instance, Meri, supposing I were to take up you offer and go and discuss the horrible details of people's lives who had been adopted by terrible people. Do you agree that I would be in remiss to suggest to those people that they would be better off to have been aborted rather than lived?

The arguments you have presented here seem to me eminently persuasive to anyone that we need to impose strict and stringent checks and restrictions on who can adopt children in order to prevent the wrong people being entrusted with children's lives. I for one completely agree with this measure, and fail to see how this negates the conclusion that you have both agreed to that adoption is better if the parents are responsible people.

Moreover, are we permitted to suggest that a bad life is reason enough to abort someone? I mean to say, should I be able to say to someone that they would have been better off being aborted rather than lived if they suffered as children under their parents, be they biological, adoptive or otherwise?
I for one don't think so, or else I would have to suggest to both of my parents that they ought to have been aborted.