10-06-2005, 06:29 PM
|
#4 (permalink)
|
|
Addict
|
Quote:
One passage used to establish the original intent of Senatorial advice and consent is the “good behavior” clause, which gives Justices lifetime appointments, with the addendum that they can be removed from office for unacceptable behavior. “The Judges… shall hold their Offices during good Behavior.” One interpretation of this passage is that it implies Congress can remove Judges from office for any sort of behavior unbecoming of a member of the judiciary. The prosecution at the impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase read the passage in this way.
“The plain and correct inference to be drawn from this language is, that a judge is to hold his office so long as he demeans himself well in it; and whenever he shall not demean himself will, he shall be removed.”
This reading gives Congress enough latitude to use the impeachment process as a tool for controlling the ideology of the Court. Senators would need only to find some instance of misconduct in the records of Justices of other ideologies in order to sack them. Yet, it was the clear intent of the Framers to establish an independent judiciary. Thus, contrary to these claims, the phrase “good behavior” does not mean that any bad behavior (read: unwanted ideology) is grounds for impeachment. Rather, it was inserted to affirm that Justices do not receive unconditional lifetime appointments: high crimes and misdemeanors are sufficient grounds for impeachment.
On the most fundamental level, the Congress should not attempt to control judicial ideology because the judiciary is intended as a check on the legislative power of the Congress. If ideology became the primary consideration, the Supreme Court would become a rubber stamp for Congressional legislation. This worry was expressed eloquently by Dean Douglas W. Kmiec when he said:
“Undertaking to make nominees carry a type of political burden of proof will over time merely invite a subservience of mind and personality that is contrary to an independent judiciary."
When ideological differences of opinion are used to justify congressional opposition to a Justice or nominee, Congress is essentially saying that a judicial ideology that does not reflect that of the legislative is not permitted. This effectively eliminates the possibility that the Supreme Court might rule against the predominant congressional ideology. The theory of checks and balances, therefore, recommends that the judiciary remain ideologically independent from, and potentially in opposition to, the general ideological sentiments of the Congress.
In the context of impeachment, partisanship can be even more deleterious to judicial independence. If Justices could be impeached or removed from office for trivial reasons, the Supreme Court would be unable to check the power of the legislative.
“A judge may thus be impeached and removed from office for an act strictly legal, when done, if any House of Representatives for any indefinite time after, shall for any reason they may act upon, choose to consider such act improper and impeachable. The constitution, sir, never intended to lay the judiciary thus prostrate at the feet of the House of Representatives.”
In the interests of maintaining a government in which the Supreme Court upholds the Constitution even in the face of legislative opposition, Congress should avoid attempting to influence the ideological direction of the Supreme Court. Efforts to the contrary threaten the independence of the judiciary and thereby make the Congress excessively influential. While it is entirely appropriate for Congress to reject unqualified nominees and to impeach felonious Justices, these same capacities should never be misused to impose a litmus test for judicial ideology.
|
Last edited by politicophile; 10-06-2005 at 09:14 PM..
|
|
|